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ABSTRACT 
 
Reclaiming Negative Space: Towards an Anthropology of Secularism in Japan 
by 
 
Cade Douglas Bourne 
 
In 2003, anthropologist and theorist Talal Asad published Formations of the Secular: 
Christianity, Islam, Modernity. This influential work presents a genealogy of “the secular,” 
the dialectic nature of that genealogy vis a vis that of the set of knowledges, sensibilities, 
policies, and affects that constitute the modern, and a response to the eminent philosopher, 
Charles Taylor’s “Modes of Secularism” (1998). Asad focuses the project by asking, “What 
is the connection between the secular as an epistemic category and secularism as a political 
doctrine? Can they be objects of anthropological inquiry? What might an Anthropology of 
secularism look like?”1 
This thesis attempts, in a preliminary fashion, to address the questions put forth by Asad 
within the context of the social, political, and religious landscape of contemporary Japan. 
Having noted a reductive tendency among certain scholars of Japanese religion and culture2 
to apprehend the secular through simple negation of the religious, my purpose is to begin to 
problematize the construction of “secular” as a valid and encompassing category through a 
                                                
1  Asad, Formations of the Secular. Kindle Loc. 48 
2  An exchange in the Electronic Journal of Contemporary Japanese Studies between 
Timothy Fitzgerald and Ian Reader exemplifies this point. 
(http://www.japanesestudies.org.uk/discussionpapers/Fitzgerald3.html) 
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detailed investigation of the conditions and consequences that pertain to secularism as a 
political doctrine in contemporary Japan. This thesis will show that Japan’s project of 
secularization is mediated by a complicated politics of memory relating to categories of 
conflict and national identity. Through a close historiographic analysis of primary and 
secondary source material related to court cases, legislation, and the political and social 
issues surrounding Yasukuni Shrine, I propose to articulate “the secular” as a dimension of 
modernity that acts not in opposition to, but in dialogue with, “the religious.” Put simply, the 
project seeks to develop a framework of central concepts and conditions from which Asad’s 
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I. From an Anthropology of Secularism  
Early in Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity, Talal Asad 
proceeds into his inquiry on the form and content of the secular as a distinctive feature of 
modernity by establishing a categorical distinction between the political doctrine of 
secularism and the secular as an epistemic category. For the purposes of the present 
discussion, the secular is best apprehended as a nexus of discourses, knowledge, and models 
of self-fashioning that are centrally located in modernity and act within institutions, groups, 
publics, counter-publics, and individuals to produce sensibilities and dispositions that are 
unique to the modern within which these factors converge. The secular is not the barren 
space devoid of religion, or, as Michael Warner explains:  
 
People often tend to think of secularity simply as the absence of religion, not 
something in itself.  Or they think of it mainly as a strong separation between church 
and state – creating again a zone of absence.  These two conceptions of secularity are 
central to the standard sociological story of secularization and the standard public 
usage of the word ‘secular’.3  
      
As opposed to representing a negative space, where the only distinguishing 
characteristic is the displacement of the religious, the secular represents a space wherein 
movements and ideas, generated in Japan and elsewhere, and whose origins trace back much 
farther than modernity emerge as epistemic tools to fashion the modern actor into a subject 
that is capable of repositioning the distinctions between public and private in relation to 
                                                
3 Warner, Varieties of Secularism in a Secular Age, p.8 
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themselves. Alternatively, we might understand the secular as one technology by which the 
modern emerges as an arrangement of the public sphere that allows for (among other things) 
the designation of “the religious” as a category and an object that can be shifted into the 
realm of private reason. 
 
An Anthropology of Secularism  
Asad crafts his principal line of inquiry by asking, “What is the connection between 
the secular as an epistemic category and secularism as a political doctrine? Can they be 
objects of anthropological inquiry? What might an Anthropology of secularism look like?”4  
When Asad mobilizes the concept of an “Anthropology of the secular,” he takes a broader 
view of the scope of anthropological inquiry. He writes: “In my view anthropology is more 
than a method, and it should not be equated—as it has popularly become—with the direction 
given to inquiry by the pseudoscientific notion of ‘fieldwork.’”5 With this in mind, he 
articulates the distinctive labor of modern anthropology as being a “comparison of 
embedded concepts (representations) between societies differently located in time or space. 
The important thing in this comparative analysis is not their origin (Western or non-
Western), but the forms of life that articulate them, the powers they release or disable.”6  
This position is among the factors contributing to my reliance upon Asad’s work. Further, in 
Genealogies of Religion (1993) Asad develops the idea that “religion” as it has come to be 
understood in the west, evolved in a specific regional and temporal context and posits the 
universal application of the term as problematic. These works underpin the assumptions that 
                                                
4 Asad. Formations of the Secular. Kindle Loc. 48. 
5 Ibid. Kindle Loc. 323-324. 
6 Ibid. 
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inform this thesis. Asad encourages anthropologists to reflect first upon the extant and 
potential discursive spaces wherein secularism emerges as an object of anthropological 
inquiry. It is my contention that reflection in the fashion suggested by Asad is a necessary 
and hitherto incomplete step in the construction of an anthropology of secularism in Japan.  
Further, Asad’s work urges us to understand the secular as a confluence of political, legal, 
and religious discourse that results in particular affects, sensibilities, and models of/for self-
formation that shape social life in the modern liberal state. Asad’s work highlights the 
discursive conditions for, and outcomes of, the development of the secular within and 
between particular cultural contexts. In the case of Asad’s work, he focuses broadly on the 
United States, Europe, and the Middle East. This thesis is an attempt to construct the 
preliminary framework that might extend that same analytical exploration to Japan. 
Each cultural context contends with a set of conditions both shared and unique that 
contribute to the formation of a secular. However, Japan is a particularly interesting case.  
While the conceptual and legal framework for a modern liberal state was being developed 
during the Meiji period (1868-1912), the trajectory of that development took a sharp turn 
with Japan’s surrender to the Allied Forces at the conclusion of the Asia Pacific War in 
1945. It was at this point that policies and practices in development leading up to the war 
were subsumed into those mandated by the Allied Forces as a condition of surrender and 
through the period of occupation. As a distinctive feature of the modern liberal state, 
secularism in Japan has likewise experienced a unique developmental trajectory. The 
experience of defeat and occupation in Japan and the degree to which religion was complicit 
in this experience creates a tension between contending narratives of memory that I will 
argue has had a significant impact on the project of secularism in Japan. In discussing the 
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conditions for the formation of a secular, Asad draws on the writings of Charles Taylor and 
John Rawls to discuss the concept of overlapping consensus in relation to the establishment 
of an independent political ethic. The development of these concepts is substantially 
mediated by memory. It is for that reason that Asad’s work takes on specific relevance to an 
exploration of the discursive spaces in Japan wherein secularism can be identified as an 
object of anthropological inquiry in a context where conflicting narratives have such a 
tangible presence in social life.  
 
Overlapping Consensus and an Independent Political Ethic 
In Formations of the Secular, Asad makes substantial reference to the writings of 
Charles Taylor in the service of constructing a unique Foucauldian genealogy of the secular.  
In following Taylor, Asad believes that one of the principal endeavors of secularism in 
relation to the development of the modern liberal state is the establishment of a political 
ethic that transcends categories such as race, religion, and class and adherence to differing 
ideological modalities. In essence, the task is to evoke a system of value and governance that 
transcends the divisive nature of the often pluralistic religious landscape of modern nation 
states. Asad writes: “What is distinctive about ‘secularism’ is that it presupposes new 
concepts of ‘religion,’ ‘ethics,’ and ‘politics’ and new imperatives associated with them.”7  
In this way, secularism is necessarily a component of this independent ethic. For both Asad 
and Taylor, these imperatives form the backbone of the political strategy of the modern 
liberal state, and for that reason, secularism becomes an integral part of the development of 
such states. However, Asad and Taylor part ways at the notion that secularism acts within 
                                                
7 Asad, Formations of the Secular, Kindle Loc. 58 
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the institutional structures of those states in similar and predictable ways. Highlighting the 
diversity of categories of secularism, Asad writes that “it is closely connected with the rise 
of a system of capitalist nation-states—mutually suspicious and grossly unequal in power 
and prosperity, each possessing a collective personality that is differently mediated and 
therefore differently guaranteed and threatened.”8 A distinctive feature of Asad’s 
formulation is his emphasis on the idea that the establishment of an independent political 
ethic should not justify a reductive model that fails to account for the historical, political, 
and cultural specificity within the modern states in which this ethic becomes necessary.  
Further, it allows Asad’s ideas a flexibility that aids in the process of articulating the 
development of secularism within the pluralistic religious landscape of Japan. 
For Taylor, the most direct route to this independent political ethic is through the 
establishment of the Rawlsian concept of overlapping consensus.9 An overlapping 
consensus occurs when members of a society can subscribe to something like an 
independent political ethic despite adherence to often contrasting normative doctrines.  
These doctrines include areas such as political ideology, morality, and religion. This 
manifests as a condition by which social actors can adhere to a principle or set of principles 
while maintaining a multiplicity of often conflicting beliefs. For Rawls (and by extension, 
Asad and Taylor), a primary feature of the idea of overlapping consensus is the relationship 
between “foreground political principles” and “background understandings.” Whereas 
“foreground political principals” represent a shared political conception of justice, the 
“background understandings” represent the structures of moral judgment within and 
                                                
8   Ibid. Kindle Loc. 149 
9  “Overlapping Consensus” is a term popularized by political philosopher, John Rawls in A 
Theory of Justice (1971) and Political Liberalism (1993) 
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between groups of discrepant doctrinal orientation that emerge as grounds for the public 
negotiation of the political judgment in question. In the Rawlsian conceptualization of the 
idea, this relationship need not be particularly intimate, a point that Taylor takes issue with.  
Asad, on the other hand, takes issue with the idea as it relies heavily on the supposedly 
direct-access nature of the liberal democratic system. Asad suggests that due to the increase 
in influence of interest groups and the labyrinthine nature of bureaucracy, the distance 
between citizens and their appointed representatives has become substantial. However, Asad 
finds utility in the idea of overlapping consensus as more of an object of political strategy 
and the means by which core political values are enforced through violence and its 
regulation. Overlapping consensus is useful as an analytical tool by which to examine the 
influence of secularism in certain public domains. It is of particular utility when thinking 
through the influence of secularism on the political, social, and religious landscape of Japan 
as I attempt later on. 
The conditions for the establishment of an independent political ethic and an 
overlapping consensus in Japan and the extent to which that process is mediated by memory 
form the body of this thesis. I invoke these concepts in particular as both Asad and Taylor 
find utility in their use, and they mark the conceptual entry point for understanding the set of 
conditions by which a “secular” might be understood in Japan. It is possible that some of 
philosophical and political baggage that this term entails might hinder understanding the 
religious topography of Japan. However, my position is that the term is heuristically 
productive, provided that certain localized considerations are integrated.   
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The Politics of Memory 
What does memory demand in relation to the construction of the national imaginary? 
How do the politics of remembrance as well as the affects and subjectivities that it mediates, 
come to figure prominently in the project of establishing an overlapping consensus? More 
poignantly, what is the relation between memory and the project of secularism in modern 
Japan? I argue that these considerations should be foremost in any endeavor that may be 
called an “anthropology of secularism” in Japan. Further, these conditions, which account 
for the distinctive nature of Japan’s religious, social, and political history, underscore the 
contention that Japan’s project of secularism contends with unique circumstances. I propose 
that it is not useful to reduce the project to the status of being a byproduct of a generalizing 
formulation of the modern, a measured removal of the religious from the public sphere, or 
the vacuum left by religion’s absence.   
 In an anthropological endeavor that must navigate issues related to memory 
in Japan, the anthropologist aught to begin with the understanding that in the largest global 
conflict to date, Japan suffered a devastating defeat followed by humiliating occupation. In 
Akiko Hashimoto’s incisive work, The Long Defeat: Cultural Trauma, Memory, and 
Identity in Japan, she begins by detailing her experience as a child growing up in Tokyo in 
the 1960’s.  She writes:  
 
As children we did not know how the Asia-Pacific War came about, or what 
exactly to make of it, but we understood that it was the single most destructive ordeal 
that the adults had experienced. Something dreadful had happened. Early images and 
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perceptions like these would ultimately color our understanding of the war as a 
national trauma.10  
 
Issues arising from the historical narratives and ways of remembering the conditions 
and consequences of the Asia Pacific War continue to haunt many aspects Japanese social 
life.  Hashimoto points out that the tensions surrounding issues of accountability and 
stigmatization result in divisive narratives, rhetoric, and subjectivities. Further, this tension 
remains due to a continued experience of defeat. The experience of defeat by the Japanese 
people did not end with surrender, occupation, or the death of the Shōwa Emperor Hirohito.  
The experience continues today as there yet remain a number of unresolved issues stemming 
from the defeat on national and international levels. In seeking evidence of the enduring 
experience of defeat, one need look no further than the charged debates regarding the status 
of “comfort women,” the continued controversy surrounding official visits to Yasukuni 
Shrine, territorial disputes involving China and Russia (among others), attempts towards 
historical revisionism in textbooks, and the ongoing movement to remilitarize.  
How do these considerations affect discussions of overlapping consensus, an 
independent political ethic, and the project of secularism? Asad maintains that “The modern 
nation as an imagined community is always mediated through constructed images.”11 With 
regard to an establishment of an overlapping consensus or an independent political ethic, no 
set of images have been more dynamic and controversial than those mediated by means of 
the shifting historical modalities of Shinto. Throughout the Meiji Period and through the end 
                                                
10  Hashimoto, The Long Defeat, Kindle Loc. 119 
11 Asad, Formations of the Secular, Kindle Loc. 109 
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of the Asia Pacific War, Shinto (or rather, a form thereof) was shaped through deliberate 
intervention by the government to be synonymous with a sense of extreme Japanese 
nationalism. This exploited and encouraged the idea that Japan’s native spirituality was 
deeply imbricated into the fabric of cultural practice so as to be indistinguishable from it. In 
short, Shinto, and by extension the Imperial System was inseparable from the construction 
of what it meant to be Japanese in terms of official nationalist rhetoric. Taking this rhetoric 
at face value, with Japan’s surrender in 1945, the Allied Forces immediately went about the 
task of the cessation of all State support for Shinto and the mandate that the Emperor 
renounce the divinity ascribed to him by that tradition. As a consequence, an anthropology 
of the secular should examine the possibility that the structure of identity within Japan 
suffered a crippling blow as part of the experience of defeat. Conversely, an anthropology of 
the secular in Japan would need to investigate the extent to which religion broadly and 
Shinto specifically was not complicit in mobilizing nationalist rhetoric, and instead, viewed 
the appropriation of ritual with apprehension as a coercive force that undermined forms of 
Shinto that were not in line with the state. Both scenarios represent seeds of competing 
narratives of memory that have evolved into the polemic forms that exist today.  
As a prominent symbol of the ongoing experience of defeat, the ambiguity around 
legal and social classifications for Shinto is emblematic of the plurality of divisive historical 
narratives that vie to renegotiate Japan’s national identity. On the other hand, Shinto as a 
network of localized spiritual traditions in Japan remains responsible for the creation and 
enactment of rituals such as jichinsai (pacification of soil gods) or hatsumōde (the first visit 
to a shrine in the new year) that blur the distinction between public space and private reason. 
The relationship between Shinto as a political object and controversial image vis a vis Shinto 
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as a spiritual and cultural system of ritual practice is at the heart of the amorphous status of 
the tradition in Japanese society. 
This leads to a discussion of the establishment of an independent political ethic in 
contemporary Japan. Directly following Japan’s surrender in 1945, the Allied Forces 
immediately addressed what they perceived as the primary ideological pillar of Japanese 
nationalism in the form of kokka shintō, or as the Allied Forces came to call it, State Shinto.  
Evidenced in the language of the Memorandum on State Shinto to the Chief of Staff, The 
Shinto Directive, and the Constitution of Japan, the goal of the Allied Forces was to 
dismantle State Shinto as a component of Japanese political ideology. I will devote 
significant discussion to these items in the sections to come.  
While this project was ultimately successful, I will argue that it relied on the 
implementation of a project of secularism that was informed by Protestant Christian 
sensibilities that were unique to the experience of the religious in Europe and the United 
States as well as upon emergent models that drew distinct lines between religious and 
political authority. As such, it failed to implement a framework by which the complicated 
cultural status of Shinto as a spiritual and cultural system of ritual practice was given voice.  
Further, it failed to give credence to the debates surrounding the classification of Shinto that 
had defined the legal parameters of secularism prior to and during the war. Shinto, as I 
intend to show, is not so easily demarcated as “religion.” It transcends the boundaries of the 
religious and the public in particular ways. As a condition of its defeat, Japan was not given 
the opportunity to create a public space wherein an overlapping consensus could be 
negotiated. Hence, the independent political ethic in the form of the 1946 Constitution that it 
was forced to adopt was not consistent with the nature of Japan’s political, social, and 
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religious landscape. It was not the result of a process that even gestured towards an 
overlapping consensus by virtue of Japan’s status as defeated. To add further complication, 
Japan’s status incurred and continues to incur additional scrutiny on an international level, 
particularly the Unites States and Japan’s neighboring East Asian nations. 
On the establishment of an overlapping consensus, Taylor and Asad differ. Whereas 
the former maintains that such a consensus is generated through persuasion and negotiation, 
the later contends that the consensus is the result of political strategies that mediate violence 
and the memory of violence. However, I submit that both of these formulations rely not only 
on the establishment of a liberal democratic state, but of a state wherein the members have 
had a stake in its formation and the elected government has the autonomy to fashion an 
independent political ethic that is consistent with the needs and sensibilities of those 
governed. Japan’s position as defeated precluded the latter. This is not to pose the question 
as to where Japan may have ended up had historical events proceeding along a different 
trajectory. Nor is the intention to claim that the 1946 Constitution was so utterly foreign in 
its form and content so as to be undecipherable in the context of Japan. Rather, in the 
specific case of the distinctions between religious and public, the framework was inadequate 
for the reasons specified above.   
Regarding the impact of the ongoing experience of defeat, Hashimoto writes:  
 
Memories of difficult experiences like war and defeat endure for many 
reasons: the nation’s trajectory may change profoundly, as it did when Japan 
surrendered sovereignty in 1945; collective life must be regenerated from a 
catastrophic national fall; and losers face the predicament of living with a 
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discredited, tainted past. In this process, the vanquished mobilize new and revised 
narratives to explain grievous national failures, mourn the dead, redirect blame, and 
recover from the burdens of stigma and guilt. The task of making a coherent story for 
the vanquished is at the same time a project of repairing the moral backbone of a 
broken society. This precarious project lies at the heart of Japan’s culture of defeat, a 
painful probe into the meaning of being Japanese.12   
 
This memory of war and defeat is ongoing in Japan.  It is a condition of social life.  
As such, it is an experience that mediates the distinctions between public and private, legal 
and forbidden, consensus and controversy, and religious and secular.  While this does not 
make the project of secularism unique to Japan, it highlights the distinctive historical and 
social factors that open novel forms of anthropological inquiry.   Again, the attempt is not to 
sound the clarion call to arms against the imperialist imposition of “secular” as a useful 
term.  Rather, by problematizing and localizing the dimensions of the project of secularism 
in Japan, the intention is to provide a set of conceptual tools from which an Anthropology of 
Secularism in Japan can develop as a fruitful enterprise. 
While I am primarily concerned with the reconfiguration of secular discourse 
following Japan’s surrender in the Asia Pacific War, the project of secularism in Japan 
begins much earlier. Antecedents for a secular thought have existed throughout Japan’s 
history. The forms of knowledge and discourse that emerged in the Late Tokugawa and 
Meiji periods brought what Trent Maxey has called “The Greatest Problem”, namely that of 
                                                
12 Ibid. Kindle Loc. 22 
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religion, to the fore.13 Much of this problem revolved around the classification of Japan’s 
native Shinto tradition. It is for that reason that my discussion of the historical foundation of 
secular thought in the Meiji necessarily includes a discussion of Shinto, as it is my position 
that the project of negotiating Shinto as a category was, in crucial ways, the project of 
negotiating the foundations of a secular in Japan. With this in mind, in the following two 
sections, I will briefly outline some key terms and offer a discussion of the ways in which 
the “problem of religion” was addressed in Japan prior to 1945.  
 
The Grammar of the Secular in Japan 
For the purposes of the present discussion, it is necessary to elaborate on a few terms 
that are central to discussion of the religious and the secular in Japan. These terms include: 
shūkyō 宗教, mushūkyō無宗教,and	seikyōbunri 政教分離. There is some debate over the 
first appearance of shūkyō 宗教 as a translation of, and equivalent to the English term 
“religion”. In The Invention of Religion in Japan (2015), Jason Ananda Josephson offers a 
nuanced historiographical account of the concept’s development in Japan as part of an 
emergent political and diplomatic lexicon necessitated by the Japanese government’s 
engagement with the threat of foreign colonial interests. Shūkyō was mobilized as a term to 
denote “religion” in the context of Japan’s exchanges with western, predominantly Christian 
interests. Trent Maxey describes this moment as a tension between the Meiji government’s 
desire to navigate the Western presumption that civilization was synonymous with 
Christendom and the perceived threat of Christian conversion implied by that presumption.14  
                                                
13 Maxey, The Greatest Problem, p. 1-5 
14 Ibid 7-11 
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By placing Buddhism and Christianity into the same classification of shūkyō, the idea was 
not only to offer a subtle resistance to the spread of Christianity in Japan, but also a 
diplomatic effort to establish Japanese religious ideology as having equivalent stature as the 
religious ideologies of western imperial powers.15 In the case of Shinto, whether it should be 
considered “religion” (shūkyō) or not was a matter of intense debate, and indeed that debate 
is central to our discussion to come and we will return to it due course.   
The next term, mushūkyō無宗教 can be understood as “non-religious” or “non-
affiliated,” as a sort of negative category in opposition to shūkyō. It is important to note that 
mushūkyō should not be understood as a correlate or stand-in for “secular”; rather, Ama 
Toshimaro suggests that it reflects the pluralistic religious landscape of Japan and the 
tendency among Japanese to engage in rituals that span a number of traditions.16 However, 
Ama pays less attention to the fact that “non-religious” and “non-affiliated” are, themselves, 
ambiguous terms. Further, it assumes that some positionality on a spectrum of what is 
categorized as “belief” (another ambiguous term) is required for one to be considered 
“religious”. This too, speaks to the difficulty in apprehending the religiosity (or lack thereof) 
of Japan.   
The final term seikyō bunri 政教分離 utilizes the kanji for politics or government in 
conjunction with one for religion followed by two that denote separation. So the term 
literally signifies “separation between religion and the state”. The following discussion of 
the development of secular thought in the Late Tokugawa and Meiji periods will not only 
                                                
15 Ibid  
16 Ama, Why Are the Japanese Non-Religious?, p. 24 
  15 
utilize these concepts, but will offer a brief history of their development as such and their 
integration into the political and diplomatic grammar of Japan. 
 
The Development of Secular Thought in the Meiji 
In understanding secularism as an ongoing project in Japan, it is necessary to discuss 
the trajectory of debates regarding the theory, process, and grammar by which that project 
has been enacted.   Further, it is important to emphasize that the project of secularism 
existed as a distinct discursive realm in Japan throughout the Meiji Period.  While the focus 
of this thesis is primarily the post war period in Japan, the following is a brief exposition of 
the historical moments and figures that contributed to the project of secularism in Japan 
prior to the Allied Occupation.  This project came to be broadly restructured through the 
imposition of secular discourse and rhetoric from the United States.  However, as this 
section will show, the project was well established prior to the war. 
In The ‘Greatest Problem’: Religion and State Formation in Meiji Japan17, Maxey 
discusses grammar in a different way than I have above. He introduces the concept of the 
“grammar of religion” as something that the emerging modern Japanese state was forced to 
develop in response to internal and external pressures. Regarding the “grammar of religion,” 
he writes: 
 
I refer to the conceptual and administrative rules that came to govern the articulation 
of state policies concerning religion.  From the regulation of religious sects, clerics, 
and practices to the identification of civic duties and the determination of educational 
                                                
17 Maxey, The “Greatest Problem”, p. 2 
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content, the state could play a decisive role in constructing the rules that governed 
not only the practice of religion, but its discursive boundaries as well.18 
 
When Maxey refers to “regulation of religious sects,” “identification of educational 
content,” and “rules that governed not only the practice of religion, but its discursive 
boundaries as well,” one could argue that the grammar being constructed is also that of 
secularism.   
In Shinto and the State (1868-1988), Helen Hardacre observes:  
In pre-Meiji Japan there existed no concept of religion as a general phenomenon, of 
which there would be variants like Christianity, Buddhism, and Shinto.  People 
spoke of having faith (shinkō) in particular kami and Buddhas, but no word existed to 
designate a separate sphere of life that could be called ‘religious,’ as opposed to the 
rest of one’s existence.19   
       
So with that in mind, it seems that productive place to begin is with the mid to late 
Tokugawa period. Between 1640 and 1853, the Tokugawa Shogunate enacted a series of 
edicts that came under the general policy of sakoku (literally “locking in the country”) which 
effectively expelled all foreigners (and the Christianity that they had brought with them) 
from Japanese soil save for limited trade relations with the Dutch, Chinese, and Koreans.  
During this period, the Dutch traders were forced to reside on the artificial island of Dejima 
in the bay of Nagasaki. The proximity of the Dutch facilitated an influx of western ideas 
                                                
18 Ibid.  
19 Hardacre, Shinto and the State, p. 18 
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specifically those related to science and technology. While initially such exchange was 
tightly controlled, this period of rangaku (Dutch Learning) is described by Grant Goodman 
as “a facet of Japanese intellectual history and as one of the variety of trends of thought 
which emerged among the Japanese educated elite during the Tokugawa Period.”20 During 
this period, western books were translated into Japanese, technological and scientific 
advancements were shared, and Japan was given access to an arrangement of the social and 
political sphere that kept apart something called “religion” as a distinct category. The Dutch 
at Dejima served as the valve of western ideas to Japan, and coupled with the influence of 
kokugaku (National Learning)21 and Neo-Confucian ideas, the period offers a historical 
foundation upon which an anthropology of secularism in Japan might stand. This is not to 
say that prior to this period, gestures towards secularization had not been made, rather that 
this period saw the confluence of factors that formalized and accelerated these gestures.  
This is also not to claim that the Dutch were solely responsible for facilitating the conditions 
by which a secular could take shape. As we will see, there were social, political, and 
intellectual changes taking place already within Japan during this period.  
In the late Tokugawa Period, scholars and writers such as Motoori Norinaga (1730-
1801) and Hirata Atsutane (1776-1843) delved into Japan’s literary and mythological past to 
champion kogaku (ancient learning) and later, kokugaku, in an attempt to craft and valorize 
an image of Japan’s pure past and superior position in the world. An important part of this 
image involved the study of the Classical Japanese works Kojiki and Nihonshoki, the 
                                                
20 Goodman, Japan and the Dutch, p. 1 
21 In John Breen’s review article “Nativism Restored” (2000), he offers a nuanced argument 
as to the problems associated with equating kokugaku (National Learning) and nativism as a 
tautology.  While the scope of his argument is beyond that of mine, I have refrained from 
conflating them in this paper because of it.   
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elevation of Shinto as the native tradition, and the centrality of the Imperial line. Kokugaku 
in Japan provided an ideological framework for “mikadoism”, or emperor worship, the 
construction of what would come to be known as Kokka Shintō or State Shintō, and the 
overall nationalistic/imperialistic sentiments during the Meiji Era. Hardacre writes:  
 
Shinto’s ties with the state before 1868 were obscure and limited for the most part to 
the rites of the imperial or shogunal courts, always coordinated with, and usually 
subordinated to, Buddhist ritual. After 1868, Buddhism lost its former state 
patronage, and Shinto was elevated and patronized by the state. This patronage did 
not come about immediately or without misgivings and negotiations in government 
and among Shinto priests. Nevertheless, by the early decades of the twentieth 
century, Shinto was providing the rites of the empire and claiming (falsely) always to 
have done so, from time immemorial.22   
       
Kokugaku was instrumental to this shift as well as the process of systematization and 
regulation of religious traditions by the Meiji government and their project of secularizing a 
variant of Shinto as a nationalistic ideology. This was only made possible by the fact that a 
significant aspect of the nativist project, particularly in the case of Mootori and Hirata 
schools was to imbue Shinto rituals with a new civic religiosity and authority derived from 
ancient sources. 
Another contributing force to the debate was Neo-Confucian thought. In the 
introduction to Principle and Practicality: Essays in Neo-Confucianism and Practical 
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Learning (1979), W.M. Theodore de Bary makes several pertinent claims about the Neo-
Confucian movement in Japan. First, although the Neo-Confucian movement was 
established during an eleventh century revival of Confucianism in China, and the texts were 
available to the Japanese, the Neo-Confucian movement in Japan did not really “come into 
its own” until the 17th century. Of particular relevance is the fact that the Zen Buddhist 
priests that largely controlled the circulation of Neo-Confucian texts in medieval Japan 
presented the texts as specifically non-religious. Second, during the Tokugawa period, Neo-
Confucian thought vied with the then prominent forms of Japanese Buddhism and 
eventually became a source for Tokugawa political and ethical ideology. Third, and perhaps 
most pertinent is Bary’s assertion that Neo-Confucianism during the period had “secular” 
and “humanistic” understandings built into the fabric of its rhetoric. This claim seems to 
operate on the construction of Neo-Confucian thought in the Late Tokugawa and Early Meiji 
periods as a single monolithic framework. On the contrary, interpretations and criticisms of 
Neo-Confucian thought have occupied a spectrum of metaphysical content from the 
syncretic suika shintō of Yamazaki Anzai or shingaku (Heart Learning) of Ishida Baigan to 
the expressly non-religious jitsugaku (Practical Learning) movement and the criticisms of 
Fukuzawa Yukichi.  In Practical Pursuits: Religion, Politics, and Personal Cultivation in 
Nineteenth Century Japan (2004), Janine Sawada examines the attempts by Neo-Confucian 
scholars in the Late Tokugawa and Early Meiji periods to assert the primacy of practical 
learning. Practical Learning incorporated Neo-Confucian and western Enlightenment ideas 
of rationality and cultivation through the use of reason and firm “this worldly” orientation. 
As part of this process Shinto became necessarily enmeshed in debates as to classification of 
traditions as shukyō due to its particular network of syncretic relationships.   
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While there are clear differences between Neo-Confucian and Western 
Enlightenment thought, there are some salient similarities that might connect the epistemic 
components of Western and Japanese constructions of the secular. It further bears note that 
Enlightenment thinkers such as Voltaire and Christian Wolff studied the Confucian texts 
retrieved by Jesuit missionaries in their trips to China.23 Asad’s formulation relies heavily on 
the influence of neo-liberalism, and the primacy of reason. Further, both he and Taylor 
position Enlightenment thought as being instrumental to the development of secularism in 
the west.  Neo-Confucianism’s attention to the power of human agency and the tradition’s 
dialectical relationship with Enlightenment thought clearly contributes some of the same 
epistemic tools.  
In the social, political, and intellectual environment of rangaku, kokugaku, and 
jitsugaku, American Commodore Perry arrived in Japan with his “black ships” in 1853.  
This signaled the end of Japan’s isolation. However, it is clear that Japan was neither fully 
isolated, nor fully resistant to ideas from abroad. Further, the momentum of these 
movements carried through into the Meiji period in critical ways that affected the debates 
regarding Shinto’s status as a religion and the Japanese State’s relationship with it. 
   In 1868 with the installation of the new Meiji government, Japan was in a position 
where it was deemed necessary to rapidly modernize and negotiate the influx of new ideas 
against the backdrop of fears of subjugation by Western political and ideological regimes.  
Thus, amidst sweeping changes to the fabric of the Japanese social and political imaginary, 
and in an effort to solidify the emerging Japanese position on the global stage, Japan 
articulated its own terms in relation to those coming in from the outside. With these changes, 
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the attitude towards Shinto was already shifting dramatically. After a violent episode in 
which Shinto and Buddhism were forcibly split under the policy of shinbutsu bunri, debates 
as to Shinto’s role with relation to the State came to the fore.   
Murakami Shigeyoshi articulates a novel approach that situated “State” Shinto into 
four historical periods of development. The “Formative Period” (1868-1889) represented a 
period that according to Murakami involved three traits: (1) The treatment of shrines as 
national institutions separate from religion. (2) The consolidation of imperial rituals. (3) The 
reorganization of all shrines around the main Shrine of Ise.  Next, the “Period of Completion 
of the Doctrine” (1889-1905) is a period during which State Shinto’s transition into a 
“national ritual system under the Imperial Constitution.” Then, the “Period of the 
Completion of the System” (early 1900’s through 1930’s) saw the consolidation of shrines 
as “ideological bases” of nationalist rhetoric and the tightening of economic and 
authoritative control by the government on a newly minted and “secular” form of Shinto.  
The “Period of fascist state religion” (1931-1945) entailed the escalation of tension with 
Shinto institutions that expressed resentment towards governmental control, the 
consolidation of control over them, and the employ of the “Kokutai discourse” as doctrine in 
kokka shintō that allowed for the support of foreign military activities in preparation for the 
war-effort. 
 Beginning with the Formative period, one of the first things that the Meiji 
government did in 1868 was to establish the Jingikan or the Office of Kami Worship, which, 
in just over a year from its establishment already outranked the Daijōkan or the Great 
Council of State. In 1871, the Jingikan was abolished and its duties transferred to the lower 
ranking Jingishō or Ministry of Shinto Religion. At the same time the Daijōkan declared all 
  22 
Shinto Shrines to be state institutions and instituted a ranking system based on size, location, 
and estimated importance with the Grand Shrine of Ise at the top. The Ministry of Shinto 
Religion had a was abolished after only one year and replaced with the Kyōbushō or 
Ministry of Religion. All Shinto shrines had been brought under State control, but the status 
of Shinto was still unclear. Specifically, it had not yet been defined as “non-religious”. 
In 1872, the government established an institution for public schooling known as the 
Daikyō-in or Great Teaching Academy a learning (or in reality propaganda) institution 
formed with the blessing of the Ministry of Religion whose 3 precepts were:  
(1) Veneration of the Kami and Love of Country.  
(2) Observance of the Way of Heaven (philosophy and religion) and of the Way of 
Humanity (morality and ethics).  
(3) Obedience to the Emperor24 
 
Shimaji Mokurai (1838-1911), a Buddhist priest from Nishi Honganji was among the 
scholars and clergy appointed to tasks abroad as part of a Meiji government policy to send 
scholars to Europe and the United States in an effort to acquire knowledge of western 
cultures and institutions. Thus, while living in France in 1872, he was tasked with the 
specific purpose of coming to some understanding of the relationship between religion and 
the state whereupon he discovered the concept of the separation of church and state and the 
Western conceptualization of freedom of religion. Upon receiving word of the Meiji 
government’s intention to establish the Daikyō-in, Shimaji immediately sent the government 
a proposal entitled “the Critique of the Three Principals”, which is largely viewed as being 
Japan’s first appeal towards religious freedom. 25 Upon his return to Japan later that year, he 
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removed his Nishi Honganji Shinshū sect from its imposed obligation to the Daikyō-in as the 
institution had become largely pro-Shinto. While Shimaji was among the most influential 
Buddhist authors of the time, there were several Buddhist interests that had a significant role 
in shaping policy. These interests came to represent a fairly unified position that Shinto as it 
was then understood should not be categorized as shūkyō. With the dissolution of the 
Daikyō-in in 1875, Shimaji and his sect began a full-scale propaganda and political 
campaign on the side of treating Shinto as specifically non-religious given its proximity to 
the Meiji Government. This move was not entirely prompted by a sense of moral outrage 
over the proximity between religion and the state. It strengthened the Shinshū sect’s 
connection to the government by downplaying the overall importance of Shinto. Further, it 
was a backlash against early attempts made by the Meiji government to establish Shinto as a 
national religion. The outcome was the State’s separation of Sect and Shrine Shinto and the 
enactment of the process whereby the latter was stripped of any real duties beyond the 
performance of state prescribed ritual as indicated by the Home Ministry’s communication 
#7 in 1882.26  
One of the most significant events of this time was the promulgation of the Meiji 
Constitution in 1889, according to which the Japanese became subjects under the absolute 
authority of the emperor. Of specific importance to our current discussion is article 28, 
which reads, “Japanese subjects shall, within limits not prejudicial to peace and order, and 
not antagonistic to their duties as subjects, enjoy freedom of religious belief.” While one 
should note that this was actually a large step forward for the cause of religious freedom in 
Japan, the article also stipulates that, so long as nothing more important to state function 
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comes up, citizens are free to believe what they want. Further, according to Ordinance 12, 
religious instruction was banished in both public and private schools.27 In this way, 
individual religious beliefs we subordinated to the state’s prerogatives and priorities. Joseph 
Kitagawa writes: 
 
The intention of the Meiji government was clearly twofold. On the one hand, it 
attempted to satisfy the popular demand for religious freedom by offering a nominal 
guarantee for it in the Constitution, especially since freedom of religious belief proved to 
be an important item in treaty revisions with foreign powers. On the other hand, the 
government continued to allow special privileges to Shinto by creating an artificial 
concept ‘State Shinto’, and calling it a cult of national morality and patriotism applicable 
to all religions28 
 
The urgency of the inclusion of this article in the constitution was necessitated by the 
desire of the Meiji government to assert their regime as socially and politically equivalent to 
western powers. Further, it was a move on the part of the Meiji government to address the 
backlash caused by the earlier attempts to establish Shinto as a national religion. 
It is important to note at this time that the “science of religion” (the antecedent to 
what we call “religious studies” today) also known as comparative religions at the time was 
in its infancy as a discipline. The text that is widely regarded as definitive in this emergent 
field was Fredrich Max Mueller’s Introduction to the Science of Religion that was published 
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in 1873. Due to a number of factors not the least of which being Japan’s project of acquiring 
foreign knowledge, and the somewhat unstable situation between Japanese traditions at the 
time, the Science of Religion moved as a discipline into Japan fairly early. As early as 1887, 
Inoue Tetsujirō was already lecturing on the comparative history of religions.   
Philosopher, poet, theologian, and historian, Inoue Tetsujirō (1885-1944) was not 
only among the first known Japanese scholars to lecture on comparative religion, but was 
also among the first group of scholars sent abroad. Inoue spent his time in Germany where 
he was able to further develop the concepts that informed his teaching. Upon his return in 
1890, he became one of the central figures in the spread of German philosophy and schools 
of thought enough to rival the more popular French and English imports at the time. 
Additionally, he was a founding intellectual behind the National Morality movement, which 
was instrumental in promoting emperor worship or “mikadoism” as it came to be known. At 
its core, the national morality movement seemed to have been a continuation of nativist 
thought that centralized the role of the emperor while extolling the virtues of a uniquely 
Japanese moral sensibility that became outwardly antagonistic towards external forces such 
as Christianity.29 Emblematic of this line of thought was his Teishitsu to shūkyō no kankei, 
or the “Relationship between the Imperial Line and Religion”. This work, published shortly 
following the issuance of the Imperial Rescript on Education in 1890 advocated a strong 
loyalty and devotion to the Imperial line on moral grounds. Essentially, he argued that 
allegiance to the Emperor was a culturally deeply instilled and uniquely Japanese moral 
imperative, and as such the obvious duty of any imperial subject. With equal vehemence, he 
opposed the spread of Christianity on the basis that it threatened national stability by placing 
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an allegiance to the faith before that of the State. This position came to be shared by the 
state, and as Maxey indicates, was one of the factors that made the political project of 
organizing and subjugating religious traditions during the Meiji such an urgent endeavor.30  
With regard to his position on Shinto specifically, he showed hesitation towards an idea that 
was gaining momentum in Japan, and had certainly been expressed by Western scholars; 
that the State’s version of Shinto was, in fact, a religion. While he recognized the religious 
aspects of Shinto, he felt that it would not be compatible with the Imperial Way, which was 
at the basis of his National Morality unless the moral eclipsed the religious. 
Another important figure in the debate surrounding the identity of Shinto was Katō 
Genchi (1873-1965). Katō was a contemporary of Inoue and like Inoue was highly 
influenced by German philosophy, but did not limit himself to it. After receiving his PhD in 
the philosophy of religion from the Imperial University of Tokyo (where Inoue was a faculty 
member), Katō filled a few short-lived lecturer positions before finding a permanent position 
at the Kokugakuin University in Tokyo. Additionally, Katō was the executive director and 
head of the research institute affiliated with the Meiji Japan Society. This organization was a 
tight knit group of scholars that brought him into contact with a variety of Western scholars 
of Japan such as R. Ponsby Fane, and D.C. Holtom. In addition to his wide variety of works 
that included a commentary on the Nihon shoki and a collaborative translation of the Kogo 
shūi, his interaction with foreign scholars prompted him to publish in English. As such, in 
1926, Katō published A Study of Shinto: The Religion of the Japanese Nation. This book 
was hugely influential because it was specifically addressed to western readers. Katō hoped 
to address the western insistence that Shinto in all of its myriad forms was classified as a 
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“religion”. So while Inoue did not define the State’s version of Shinto as a religion, Katō 
harbored no such reservations. While there was perhaps an opportunity for Katō to clarify 
certain finer points about the complexity of Shinto’s relationship to the State, Katō’s book 
reads ostensibly like a work produced by a Western scholar. Katō walks the reader through 
various phases of Shinto’s development in terms that are entirely Western. For example, he 
begins with Shinto as a nature religion and continues with poly-demonistic phases, animism, 
totemism, polytheism, and monotheism. Each chapter includes a meticulous comparative 
analysis often drawing upon Greek or Abrahamic traditions for similarities. That said, a 
unique subtlety evolves in the later chapters where Katō begins to discuss Shinto in terms of 
being an “Ethico-Intellectualistic tradition”, which starts to afford more and more primacy to 
morality. 31 This we find to be a bit closer to Inoue’s position. The penultimate chapter 
discusses “Some deeper reflections upon the Divine Protection of the Nation, a problem 
unsolved from the old standpoint of Shinto, the national religion of Japan.” Other later 
chapters include “Shinto is the Japanese National Religion of Natural Growth” and “Inner 
Purity Emphasized, and Sincerity or Uprightness as the Fundamental Ethical Principle 
Becomes Pre-Eminent in Shinto”.  Further, from the very preface, Katō employs language 
such as, “Shinto is by no means to be classed with the religions of the past.  It is alive - nay, 
it is vitally active in the ethico-religious consciousness and national life of the patriotic 
Japanese of today.”32 
Katō’s text exposed readers not only to the idea that Shinto was a religion from the 
point of view of a Japanese author and one who specialized in the comparative study of 
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religion, but he subtly wove in the idea that Shinto, as an ethico-intellectual tradition bound 
in morality and sown into the very fabric of the Japanese nation, could incorporate an 
ideology such as was perpetuated by the State’s version of it. However, it appears that this 
subtly was lost on many of his foreign contemporaries who praised the work for validating 
the same conclusions that they had long championed. This added additional pressure from 
the outside to categorize Shinto wholesale as a religion and ultimately contributed to the 
Allied Forces response to what it then called (and coined the term) State Shinto in the first 
days of occupation. 
 This brief history of the debate around the category of shūkyō and its relationship to 
the category of Shinto is by no means intended to be exhaustive or definitive. Rather, it is 
intended to highlight some of the intersections of Shinto, secular thought, and the state in the 
Late Tokugawa and Meiji periods. The attention to policy regarding the secular and the 
religious during these periods are the first steps in understanding the development of 
secularism in modern Japan. However, as we will see in the next chapter, the problem of the 
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II.  THE PROBLEM OF “THE SECULAR” IN MODERN JAPAN 
A central preoccupation of western academics engaged in the study of Japanese 
religious traditions is the articulation of “religion” or “the religious” as an object of formal 
inquiry within the Japanese socio-political landscape. An impressive volume of scholarly 
work that focuses on the study of Japanese religious traditions is replete with meditations on 
the form, content, and philosophical antecedents of the developmental trajectory of 
“religion”.33 However, as noted previously, there are those among these interventions that 
are marked by the conspicuous absence of likewise impassioned debates regarding the form, 
content, and philosophical antecedents of the “secular” as an object of formal inquiry. Asad 
rightly notes:  
 
Any discipline that seeks to understand ‘religion’ must also try to understand its 
other. Anthropology in particular—the discipline that has sought to understand the 
strangeness of the non-European world—also needs to grasp more fully what is 
implied in its being at once modern and secular.34   
 
In the past two decades, insightful work such as that of Taylor, Asad, Charles 
Hirschkind, José Casanova, Partha Chatterjee and an array of theorists and theologians have 
been devoted to a comprehensive investigation of the contours of the myriad categories of 
“the secular,” and the political manifestation thereof in the form of “secularism.” Yet, it 
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seems that similar interventions in the context of the Japanese religious sphere have yet to be 
fully realized. This is not to say that inquiries regarding the nature of the secular and its role 
within Japanese social and political life are completely absent. The present situation within 
which a lack of discourse regarding the secular in Japan is evident, I will argue, is largely 
due to: (1) A fundamental misunderstanding of the form and content of the secular and its 
relationship with the religious in Japan and (2) An ambiguity as to the classification of 
religious organizations (specifically those classified as Shinto) as such. These two factors 
are introduced in this section and the following.  
Based on a 2012 opinion poll conducted by WIN-Gallup International, the 
organization was able to compile a Global Index of Religion and Atheism35. In the published 
findings among Japanese respondents, 16% identified as a “Religious Person,” 31% 
identified as “Not A Religious Person,” 31% identified as “A Convinced Atheist,” and the 
remaining 23% identified as “Don’t know/No Response.” This poll is consistent with similar 
polls in Japan that tend to show a high level of membership with religious organizations 
curiously coupled with a low instance of what one might classify as “belief.” In light of 
these findings, one might be led to the conclusion that an understanding of “the secular” is 
not only necessary, but also germane to the lived experience of “religion” in Japan. In 2003, 
anthropologist Timothy Fitzgerald published “‘Religion’ and ‘the Secular’ in Japan: 
Problems in History, Social Anthropology, and the Study of Religion.” In this article, 
Fitzgerald attempts to “problematize religion insofar as it has entered the Japanese 
vocabulary, either as ‘religion’ or as ‘shūkyō’, but not to assume without question that it is a 
neutral and valid analytical category, and more importantly not to talk as though ‘it’ is 
                                                
35 The complete findings are available at: 
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somehow ‘there’.”36 The article proceeds through an exacting analysis of “shūkyō” which is 
the most prominent stand-in for the western term “religion,” but as Maxey stresses, is one 
term among many. In this analysis, Fitzgerald makes constant reference to “the secular,” but 
in no way does he offer any insight as to what “the secular” actually entails beyond “that 
which is not religion” and its “tacit distinction” from “the religious.”37 In positing the 
secular as a sort of negative space, Fitzgerald engages in what has become a common 
practice of defining by negation. Not only is this problematic in light of the tenuous status of 
“religion” as a formal bounded entity, but it also makes Fitzgerald guilty of conceptualizing 
“the secular” in a manner that he cautions against conceptualizing “religion.” José Casanova 
identifies the problem in that, “it is not so much that they question the secularization of 
society, but simply that they take it for granted as an unremarkable fact.”38 Asad also writes, 
“The secular, I argue, is neither continuous with the religious that supposedly preceded it 
(that is, it is not the latest phase of a sacred origin) nor a simple break from it (that is, it is 
not the opposite, an essence that excludes the sacred). I take the secular to be a concept that 
brings together certain behaviors, knowledges, and sensibilities in modern life.”39 The 
pervading trend of referencing “the secular” by negation of “religion” and the insistence on 
the binary nature of a “religious-secular dichotomy” is at the very heart of what I perceive as 
a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of the secular and its role in Japanese social 
life. Rather, I intend to convey the notion that the categories of the “religious” and “secular” 
are best apprehended not as mechanically determinate of each other, but as dialectically 
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constituted and complementary in form.  Further, it is from this foundation, that I propose 
that an anthropology of secularism in Japan might unfold. 
 
The Problem of Shinto 
In Nihonjin wa naze mushukyō nano ka (日本人はなぜ無宗教なのか Why Are The 
Japanese Non-Religious), Ama Toshimaru delves into the epistemological dimensions of the 
relationship between religion and the Japanese people.40 His primary contention is that the 
Japanese largely identify as mushukyō, which can be translated as “non-religious” or 
“unaffiliated”. This mushukyō sensibility is not to be confused with atheism, since many 
Japanese often do not identify with a specific religious identity. This includes taking an 
explicitly atheistic position. Large numbers of Japanese visit Shinto Shrines on New Years 
Day for hatsumode, take part in higun (visits to family graves on the equinoxes), obon (a 
mid-summer festival honoring the dead), other festivals that have historically had a religious 
significance, and have butsudan family altars in their homes. Ama argues that this mushukyō 
sensibility pervades as the result many factors that were discussed in the previous chapter, 
namely: The historically syncretic relationship between Buddhism and Shinto in Japan, the 
influence of rationalistic Confucian thought, and the removal of religion from the public 
sphere beginning in the Meiji period.41   
 In addition to his discussion of mushukyō as a shared sensibility among many 
Japanese, Ama makes a distinction between revealed and natural religion. This distinction is 
made based on the presence or absence of a centralized text, set of texts, or doctrines. As 
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such, traditions such as Christianity and most forms of Buddhism fall under the category of 
revealed religion. It is also the classification of religion that is most commonly associated 
with the term shukyō, the term that became the Japanese correlate for “religion” in the late 
nineteenth century. In contrast, Ama’s formulation of natural religion is more localized.  
Ama writes: “it is hard to define natural religion or ascertain precisely when it emerged, who 
preached about it, or how it was adopted into the lives of the people.”42 Ama suggests that 
the practices of honoring ancestors and local kami, falls under the auspices of natural 
religion. That said, Ama writes as follows:  
 
In my opinion, Shinto is derived from natural religion, but is not a natural religion itself.  
Shinto developed as a belief system in the Court in which the Emperor was 
apotheosized, and it appeared as early as the ninth century. Shinto’s belief in kami is 
preserved through natural religion and reconstructed in Chinese philosophy, among other 
influences. Although the founder of Shinto is unknown, the religion has been formalized 
since the ninth century. Shinto can be classified somewhere between revealed and 
natural religion.43 
  
The problematic nature of this categorization is emblematic of the broader confusion 
regarding the status of Shinto as a religion. Ama attempts to isolate Shinto ritual and 
practice as distinct from the institutional structure of Shinto. Further, this differentiation is 
based on a framework wherein Shinto is discussed in terms of being representative of one or 
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another type of religion. Ama suggests that observances such as annual visits to Shinto 
shrines on New Year’s Day, festivals honoring the deceased, or ceremonies conducted 
during the groundbreaking for construction projects have become so imbricated into the 
fabric of Japanese culture, that they warrant a distinction. Essentially, as these practices fall 
under the classification of natural religion, they needn’t be subject to the same privatization 
that certain other forms of Shinto practice would be. In this, natural religion represents a 
cluster of ritual practices that are more commonly understood as customs. “The majority of 
Japanese”, Ama writes, “do not regard rituals as part of religious activities, but rather see 
them as customs.”44 Hence, in addition to the reasons given above, the Japanese people 
maintain a mushukyō status as a result of the commonly held belief that many important 
Shinto practices are cultural customs and thereby public matters.   
 While Ama’s account is peppered with generalizations, the sense is that Shinto 
represents something of a gray area in terms of that which is socially regarded as public vis a 
vis that which is regarded as private. Ama’s broad and reductive manner of addressing the 
categorization of Shinto is, I submit, more instructive to view as a commentary through its 
lack of commitment than through its rigor as an academic endeavor. The broad and passive 
rhetoric that Ama posits exemplifies the need for the type of anthropological inquiry that 
this thesis calls for. As I mention previously, the secular exists as an arrangement of the 
public sphere that allows for (among other things) the designation of “the religious” as a 
category and an object that can be shifted into the realm of private reason. One of the most 
basic requirements for this shift is that there be a clear designation of a given object or set of 
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objects as “religion.” In the Japanese religious landscape, Shinto is unique in that it 
encompasses certain modes of belief, ritual, and practice that, as we will see, have been 
consistently defined as public custom or civil obligation only from the promulgation of the 
Meiji Constitution in 1889. As the network of localized practices that fall under the term 
Shinto has become, in modernity deeply woven into the fabric of Japanese culture in a 
number of ways, its status as a religion becomes problematic. In the context of Japanese 
society and legislation, the inability to apprehend Shinto as “religion” and thereby “private” 
highlights the complexity of the project of grasping the nature of the secular in Japan.  
Additionally, the distinction between public and private and the technologies and forms of 
knowledge by which matters are differentiated are at the center of religious controversy. In 
Japan, this is not necessarily due to competing religious ideologies as might be found in Sri 
Lanka, India, or Israel. Rather, the controversies involve the mobilization of “public” and 
“private” as sites of negotiating the politics of memory which, in turn, mediates the 
possibility of an overlapping consensus. 
 
Formations of an Independent Political Ethic 
In the preceding chapter, I introduced (or rather, borrowed) the idea that the secular, 
as understood in the scholarship of Talal Asad, Charles Taylor, and others, requires the 
establishment of a political ethic that is independent from what John Rawls classifies as 
competing normative doctrines. This understanding is specific to modern democratic 
countries wherein policy is articulated and enforced by appointed representatives through 
legislative and judicial mediation. In the following, I will introduce the conditions associated 
with the secular in Japan and the contemporary concerns regarding Shinto through the 
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analysis of key documents and legislation that exhibit and inform the State’s position with 
regard to religious organizations following Japan’s surrender in the Asia-Pacific War. These 
items serve as a testament to the attempts made by Japan to establish the independent 
political ethic in question. Further, they serve as tools that are vital to any investigation of 
secularism in Japan (including ideas of secularism imposed by external forces). I mark a 
divide with the immediate post-war period for two important reasons. First, the present 
Japanese Constitution, drafted in 1946, was modeled after the Constitution of the United 
States. 45 As such, the Japanese Constitution formalized Japan’s status as a modern 
democratic state. Second, having relied heavily on the form and content of the Constitution 
of the United States, the Japanese Constitution includes Articles 20 and 89 that deal with 
religious freedom and the relationship between the State and religious organizations. 
With the promulgation of Japan’s 1946 Constitution, new standards for the 
enforcement of the separation between religious and public interests came to the fore 
together with the mandate to diligently enforce this separation in accordance with foreign 
interests. These articles represent the ostensible boundary between religion and the State as 
well as the presence of the political doctrine of secularism. This boundary, structured to be 
inviolable, takes shape as something of a porous membrane through which competing 
ideological positions and subjectivities engage in a dialectic that manifests an unstable 
balance between formulae for national memory and identity. It is important to note that 
nowhere in the Constitution is there offered an articulation of the form and content of what 
“religion” entails. Such determinations fell to the discretion of the courts. For the purposes 
                                                
45 A full English version of which can be found at 
http://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html 
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of this discussion, it is important to note the phrasing of these articles, as I will make 
reference to it as I examine the specific legislation and court cases. The articles are as 
follows: 
Article 20: Freedom of religion is guaranteed to all. No religious organization shall 
receive any privileges from the State, nor exercise any political authority. 
No person shall be compelled to take part in any religious act, celebration, rite or 
practice. The State and its organs shall refrain from religious education or any other 
religious activity. 
Article 89: No public money or other property shall be expended or appropriated for the 
use, benefit or maintenance of any religious institution or association, or for any charitable, 
educational or benevolent enterprises not under the control of public authority. 
 
With regard to these articles, traditions such as Buddhism or Christianity have 
existed in a realm of relative clarity in terms of legal categorization and precedence. This 
legal categorization was a holdover from the attempts made by the Meiji government to 
classify Buddhism and Christianity as shūkyō in the interest of isolating Shinto as distinct. 
This is not to imply that these traditions have not experienced legal battles, only that the 
native Shinto tradition has had a much more contested relationship with Japan’s public and 
political spheres in the post-war era. This relationship has proved highly problematic as the 
result of being imbricated with politics of memory wherein competing models of 
remembering and national identity are centrally located in disputes involving the 
constitutionality of cases involving Shinto. Further, secularism as a political doctrine relies 
on the creation of a framework wherein the religious can be identified as such and addressed 
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in accordance with public interest. In the case of Shinto, such a framework simply does not 
exist. Consequently, the judiciary in Japan has exhibited significant inconsistency in 
positioning itself in relation to it. With the often polemic and highly public nature of such 
disputes, the story of secularism in post-war Japan is very much the story of the State’s 
relationship with Shinto. 
In the following discussion of the Memorandum on State Shinto to the Chief of Staff 
(1945), The Shinto Directive (1945), and The Religious Corporations Act (1951), I aim to 
construct a basic genealogy of the relationship between Shinto and the Japanese State, 
thereby complicating the idea that Japan has firmly established an independent political 
ethic in the legislative and judicial realms.  
 
The “Memorandum on State Shinto” and the “Shinto Directive” 
While State Shinto as a nationalizing ideological force had a profound affect upon 
Japan’s military ambitions and the Allied Forces response to them during the Asia Pacific 
War, the legacy of the elevation and ultimate downfall of kokka or State Shinto remains 
palpable to this day. The problem of how to address State Shinto following Japan’s 
surrender became a primary concern for the Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers 
(SCAP).46 Having identified the galvanizing influence of kokka shintō with regard to the 
imperial ambitions of Japan and its populace, SCAP issued the Directive for the 
Disestablishment of Shinto or “Shinto Directive” on December 15, 1945 as the first of a 
series of regulations whose principal aim was the deconstruction of the ultra-nationalism 
                                                
46 Usage of SCAP here also refers to the General Headquarters (GHQ) or offices and 
positions as well as the position of General Douglas MacArthur. 
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that had hurled Japan into global conflict.47 However, The Shinto Directive, and indeed, the 
greater portion of the conceptual framework for dealing with State Shinto that was 
mobilized by the SCAP during their post-war occupation of Japan was developed based on 
the analysis presented in a more obscure document: the Memorandum on State Shinto to the 
Chief of Staff (hereafter referred to simply as the Memorandum). The Memorandum was 
authored on December 3, 1945 by Ken Dyke, Brigadier General and head of the Information 
and Education Section of Army Forces, Pacific (AFPAC).48 It also included significant 
contribution from DC Holtom and George Sansom, who were both well-known Western 
scholars of Japanese religion and history.49 The Memorandum discloses those aspects of 
State Shinto that were of the greatest concern from the perspective of the SCAP. Further, it 
served as the primary source for SCAP in terms of organizing strategies and the requisite 
background necessary to formulate a program to address State Shinto as an ideological 
threat. In contrast to the relatively simple phrasing employed both in the Shinto Directive 
and the relevant articles in the post-war Constitution, the Memorandum articulates a depth 
and complexity of knowledge and tactics offered in the interest of the deinstitutionalization 
                                                
 
47 An original English version of which can be found in Contemporary Religions in Japan 
Vol. 1, No. 2 (Jun., 1960), pp. 85-89 
 
48 This information can be found in: Woodard, William P The Allied Occupation Of Japan 
1945-1952 and Japanese Religions (Leiden; J. Brill. 1972) 22-26 
A full version of the Memorandum appears in Contemporary Religions In Japan 7: 321-
46, 1966.   
49 DC Holtom is the author of Modern Japan and Shinto Nationalism (Chicago: Chicago 
University Press, 1943) and the curiously named The National Faith of Japan: A Study of 
Modern Shinto (London/New York: Routledge, 1938).   
George Sansom is noted scholar of Pre-Modern Japan whose works included a three 
volume History of Japan up to 1867 (1958, 1961, 1963). 
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of State Shinto. I will examine some of those issues and concerns briefly here in an effort to 
illustrate the Allied position with regard to Shinto, as it was this position that directly 
influenced post-war policy and the development of secularism in Japan. Further, the 
Memorandum displays the same inconsistency in categorizing Shinto as a religious tradition 
that is found in the items of legislation and court decisions that I address later in this chapter.  
Broadly speaking, the Memorandum is organized into three sections: an 
“Introduction,” “Facts Bearing on the Problem,” and “Actions Recommended.” The text in 
the section “Facts Bearing on the Problem” accounts for the majority of the document and 
includes sub-sections such as: “Nature of Shinto,” “Evolution of State Shinto,” “State Shinto 
Doctrine,” “Distinction Between State Shinto and Sect (Kyōha教派) Shinto,” and a section 
for Conclusions. In examining the language of the Memorandum, it becomes clear that the 
SCAP understood that State Shinto did not represent all of Shinto. Rather, the Japanese 
Government had mobilized a specific interpretation of Shrine (Jinja 神社) Shinto to de-
sacralize it in an attempt to actualize a nationalistic fervor that could provide the ideological 
framework for Japan’s imperialistic and militaristic goals. However, the SCAP’s 
understanding of the complexity and diversity of Shinto practice and history ends with this 
distinction. This discrepancy is vital to understanding the SCAP position with regard to 
policy dealing with religion in Japan because it shows that the Allies were only partially 
aware of the multifaceted and sectarian nature of Shinto exemplified in the language 
employed in the Shinto Directive and the absolutist positionality mandated by Japan’s post-
war Constitution. However, while the analysis in the Memorandum is more extensive than 
one might assume on the basis of the Shinto Directive alone, it does make several subtle 
claims that speak to the ambiguity with which the SCAP regarded Shinto.  
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In the section on the “Nature of Shinto,” a subsection entitled “Shinto variously 
interpreted,” the text discusses the lack of a “clear-cut or precisely stated theology, dogma, 
or philosophy.” This statement is important as it illustrates a fundamental discontinuity 
between the complexity of Shinto history and practice and the reductive model of “religion” 
influenced by normative western Judeo-Christian models that was employed by the SCAP in 
order to determine the fate of an entire tradition. Following Asad and Taylor, Jason Ananda 
Josephson articulates the secular as “a special discourse of Christianity (particularly 
Protestantism)”; he adds: “Western Christianity and the Enlightenment produced a set of 
binary oppositions between the religious and secular; church and state, which it then 
attempted to impose globally.”50 This is to say that the model for the religious, and by 
extension, the secular that was imposed by the SCAP was largely based on a Protestant 
Christian model. While the language of the entire document substantiates this assessment, it 
is not to say that Protestantism was responsible for secularism in the West; rather, that the 
model employed by the SCAP was a reductionist model for religion based on these ideals.  
In this model, the centrality of doctrine is among the defining characteristics. As such, one 
can already see inherent difficulties in attempting to apply this model wholesale to the 
network of localized lineages of ritual represented by the term: Shinto. This inconsistency, 
however, did not deter the Allied Forces from doing precisely that. 
In the section on “Conclusions” in the Memorandum, the first article states, “State 
Shinto is composed of both secular and religious elements, the latter predominating to such a 
great extent that there is no doubt that State Shinto is a religion.” (Emphasis mine). At no 
                                                
50 Josephson, The Invention of Religion, p. 135-137 
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point in the Memorandum does the author(s) offer a definition of religion. Rather, it is taken 
for granted that all parties within the Allied chain of command for whom the fruits of this 
investigative enterprise might apply, subscribe to the same schema regarding the conditions 
for a religion to be known as such. Further, the phrasing of the article betrays a lack of 
consideration on the part of the Allies towards the potential for alternative conceptual 
frameworks and paradigms of ritual and belief that might significantly deviate from what 
they implicitly associated with the Protestant Christian version thereof. In addition to those 
stated above, the Memorandum operates on the assumptions that “religion” is a category 
distinct from culture, reliant upon the presence of a central doctrine or set of doctrines, and 
the reductive assessment that the division between Shrine and Sect Shinto was sufficient to 
encapsulate its diversity. Furthermore, it bears consideration that the intent of the SCAP 
during this period was to understand Shinto only in an effort to silence its influence in the 
public sphere. The importance of this moment cannot be overstated. It was not the first time 
that Shinto or a version thereof had been labeled as “religion”. George Sansom and DC 
Holtom, whom I mentioned previously as contributors to this document, both offered such a 
categorization in their works; and as we have seen, Katō Genchi also explicitly posited 
Shinto as the “Religion of the Japanese Nation.” However, in all of these cases, the 
renderings were much more nuanced and comprehensive than the Memorandum. The 
unwavering categorization of Shinto as “religion” in the Memorandum informed the framing 
of Shinto as such in the pursuant Shinto Directive as well as articles 20 and 89 of the Post-
War Constitution.  
The imposition of this categorization of Shinto, based on a reductive model of 
“religion,” failed to account for the possibility (and reality) that the Japanese institutional 
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topography appears very different than that of the West in regard to landmarks of 
metaphysical significance. In that (1) The SCAP did not understand the complexity of 
Shinto as a tradition, and yet (2) applied to it a status as religious (3) based on a Protestant 
Christian model of “religion” (and by extension the secular), illustrates the set of 
knowledges operative during the formation of and transition to Japan’s current status as a 
modern democratic state.   
In contrast to the relatively succinct tone of the Memorandum, the phrasing of the 
Shinto Directive and the constitutional articles could be read as a blunt force attack against 
all of Shinto, or indeed, all religious activity in proximity to the state. However, the explicit 
goals of the Memorandum offer a much more calculated and surgical strategy for the 
specific removal of “State” Shinto teachings from the public sphere. According to the 
Memorandum, its goal was not an attack on Shinto as an ethical or ritual system, but rather, 
the formulation of a strategy for dismantling the coercive nature of the relationship between 
Shinto and the State. The “Conclusions” section of the Memorandum states: 
 
Shinto cannot be abolished as a religion: that possibility is precluded both by 
the doctrine of religious freedom and by the nature of religion itself.  
Actually, there is no need to attempt to abolish Shinto as a religion or to 
attempt to separate Shinto from the Emperor, which is to say practically the 
same thing. The danger of Shinto lies (a) in its sponsorship, support, and 
propagation by the State (b) in the uses to which Japanese governments and 
Shinto nationalists have put its more or less vague mythology of divine origin 
of land, emperor, and people, and (c) in the rigid compulsion enforced upon 
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all Japanese to observe its rituals and outwardly to accept its promises as 
actual fact.”51 
 
The Shinto Directive was the outcome of the research and recommendations 
articulated in the Memorandum.  Again, in the case of the Shinto Directive, it is important to 
note that for various purposes including the removal of State Shinto from the public sphere, 
Shinto was categorized as a religion by the Allied Command. In this relatively brief series of 
mandates to the Japanese government, the General Headquarters (GHQ) of the Supreme 
Commander for the Allied Powers emphasized four specific intentions for the directive, 
namely, 
(1) free the Japanese people from direct or indirect compulsion to believe or 
profess to believe in a religion or cult officially designated by the state, and 
(2) lift from the Japanese people the burden of compulsory financial support of 
an ideology which has contributed to their war, guile, defeat, suffering, privation, 
and present deplorable condition, and 
(3) prevent a recurrence of the perversion of Shinto theory and beliefs into a 
militaristic and ultra-nationalistic propaganda designed to delude the Japanese people 
and lead them into wars of aggression, and 
(4) assist the Japanese people in a rededication of their national life to building a 
new Japan based upon the ideals of perpetual peace and democracy. 
 
                                                
51 Memorandum on State Shinto to the Chief of Staff (Section 4, Article 2) 
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Again, in the case of the Shinto Directive, it is important to note the reductive model 
by which the SCAP categorized Shinto as a religion. In his book, Kokka Shintō to nihonjin 
国家神道と日本人 (State Shinto and the lives of Japanese People)52, Shimazono Susumu 
discusses the far reaching effects that the Shinto Directive had on the legislative and public 
view of Shinto in the post war era. Regarding the four intentions referred to above, he 
writes, “The Shinto Directive was based on the American view of religion. The intent of 
these sentences is not necessarily easy to understand for the Japanese people.  This is 
because it strongly reflects a very American religious outlook, and because they (the 
American authors) tried to understand State Shinto in the mold of American religion.”53  
With specific regard to Shinto (as opposed to other Japanese religious traditions) 
Shimazono’s statement supports the idea that the reductive mold within which the SCAP 
imagined Shinto fitting was perhaps inconsistent with the model in which Japan had 
understood it for centuries. Even in the Meiji period, when the status of Shinto was 
contested, the attempts made by the Meiji government were in the service of understanding 
the role of Shinto in society, whereas the intention of the SCAP was to minimize that role.   
In accordance with these intentions, the mandates in the Shinto Directive articulated 
mechanisms by which State Shinto and the centrality and deification of the Imperial line 
were forcefully removed from the public sphere or abolished outright. The mandates in 
question included the cessation of public funding for any Shinto organizations; the 
unequivocal removal of all “ultra-nationalistic and militaristic” content from Shinto 
                                                
52 Shimazono Susumu島薗進. “Kokka shintō to nihonjin”国家神道と日本人 (Kokka Shinto 
and the lives of Japanese People) Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten岩波新書 (2015): 74-83.  
53 Ibid. 
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doctrines, practices, rites, and ceremonies; the prohibition of the dissemination of Shinto 
doctrine in public education; and the complete separation of church and state (seikyōbunri).  
While these mandates had immediate effects from the inception of the Allied occupation of 
Japan, they also had an enduring presence as they formed the foundation for Articles 20 and 
89 of Japan’s Constitution and have remained in effect and, in some cases, hotly contested 
since. Further the inconsistency of the status of Shinto carries over into the Religious 
Corporations Act, as this piece of legislation became the State’s metric for determining the 
status of, and rights afforded to, religious organizations. 
 
The Religious Corporations Act 
Following the Religious Organizations Law (1939) and the Religious Corporations 
Ordinance (1945), the Religious Corporations Act (hereafter RCA) was enacted in April of 
1951 as a means of articulating the boundaries between the State and religious organizations 
guaranteed in Articles 20 and 89 of the Japanese Constitution. Containing 89 Articles, the 
RCA provided the framework wherein “religious organizations” could own and manage 
property, and operate “business affairs and enterprises for the achievement of their 
purposes.”54 A definition of “religious organization” is offered in Article 2: 
 
"Religious organization" as used in this Act means any of the organizations listed below 
whose primary purposes consist in the dissemination of religious teachings, the conduct 
of ceremonies and functions, and the education and nurture of believers: 
                                                
54 Religious Corporations Act. Chapter 1.  Article 1. 
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(i) a shrine (jinja), temple (ji-in), church (kyokai), monastery or convent 
(shudoin) having an establishment(s) for worship, or any other similar organization; 
or 
(ii) a denomination (kyoha, shuha or kyodan), church (kyokai), order 
(shudokai),or diocese or district (shikyo-ku) which comprises any of the 
organizations listed in the preceding item, or any other similar organization.  
 
The RCA draws heavily from the American model for establishing ecclesiastical 
organizations as non-profit civil corporations subject to common law.55 While in the United 
States, the laws governing the formation of non-profit religious corporations differ from 
state to state, they generally maintain that a religious corporation is explicitly not-for-profit.  
Conversely, the RCA allows that a “religious corporation may, insofar as it is not contrary to 
its purpose, conduct an enterprise other than a public welfare enterprise.”56 This differs from 
the American model in that Japanese religious corporations may engage in profit-making 
ventures as long as the profits from said ventures are applied directly to the growth, 
maintenance, or public welfare endeavors of the organization in question. Furthermore, the 
RCA takes a much more explicit stance on the position of governmental oversight of the 
“secular” affairs of religious organizations. The Religious Corporations Council, established 
within the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science, and Technology oversees the 
administration of religious corporations with a strict mandate that it shall “not in any form, 
undertake mediation concerning or interfere in religious matters, such as faith, discipline, 
                                                
55 http://www.ccel.org/s/schaff/encyc/encyc09/htm/iv.vii.cxli.htm 
56 Religious Corporations Act. Chapter 2. Article 6.  
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and customs, etc., of the religious organization”.57 While the RCA requires that religious 
organizations maintain reports detailing finances, assets, and membership, these reports are 
only made available to representatives of the Religious Corporation Council in a very 
narrow set of circumstances that involve the violation of an Article in the RCA.58 Otherwise, 
religious corporations are expected to act with a degree of autonomy that speaks to the 
hesitancy on the part of the Japanese government to risk any breaches of Articles 20 and 89 
of the Constitution. It should be further noted that the autonomy once given religious 
corporations in Japan exceeded that afforded to religious corporations in the United States.  
This lack of oversight was one of the enabling factors that led to the sarin gas attacks in the 
Tokyo subway system that was perpetrated by the Aum Shinrikyō (オウム真理教) religious 
organization in 1995. 
According to the Statistics Bureau of Japan, as of 2015, there were 180, 710 
registered religious corporations in Japan. Of those, 84,868 (47%) were registered Shinto 
organizations.59 As the discussion in the following chapter of court cases address the status 
of Shinto as a religion, it is important to note that most (not all) establishments and 
organizations related to the practice of Shinto are registered as religious corporations, and 
thereby recognized as such by the State in all civil matters. In short, relative to the exercise 
of giving form and definition to that which may or may not be considered a religion, 
registration as a religious corporation officially categorizes an organization as such in the 
                                                
57 Religious Corporations Act. Chapter 8. Article 71. 
58 Religious Corporations Act.  Chapter 3. Article 25.  
59 http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/nenkan/back64/1431-23.htm.  It is interesting to 
note that these statistics that pertain to religion appear under the heading “Culture”. 
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eyes of the courts, and by extension, the State. Although, this categorization has not been 
without controversy. 
To summarize the discussion thus far, the goal of this chapter has been to articulate 
the gestures that Japan has made towards the establishment of an independent political ethic 
in the postwar era. What can this tell us about secularism in Japan? One aspect that bears 
repetition is that although Japan had a clear trajectory of the development of ideas that could 
constitute a secular, the particular project of secularism that pervades Japanese legal 
discourse was mandated without reference to the developments in ideas regarding the 
construction of the religious and the secular up to and during the Meiji period. This is not to 
say that elsewhere a perfected independent ethic has been established and implemented 
without controversy. Indeed, one might argue that the implementation of an idealized 
American category of secularism has had more success in Japan than it has in the 
complicated religious and political landscape of the United States. However, the weight of 
the task of articulating the components of an anthropology of the secular in Japan demands 
that we integrate the idea that as of Japan’s surrender at the end of the Asia-Pacific War: 
within the legislative and judicial sphere within which secularism operates, categories of the 
religious and by extension the secular were imposed by hostile external forces with their 
own intrinsic motivations and influenced by Protestant Christian sensibilities. This is not to 
say that Japan was headed in a direction where the influence of secularism would not have 
developed. Indeed, as I have attempted to illustrate in the previous section, strides towards 
secularization were already instigated in the Meiji.  Rather, that the postwar Constitution 
ensured that it did, and in very specific ways. The disjunction actualized by the imposition 
of foreign categories is evident in the legislative, judicial, and social ambiguity around 
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Japan’s native Shinto tradition. This problem of Shinto addressed through the lens of 
prominent court cases and analysis of the controversy surrounding Yasukuni Shrine are 
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III.  TOWARDS AN OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS 
 In “The Idea of Overlapping Consensus,” John Rawls considers the variations of 
conceptions of justice in a modern democratic state.60 Rawls discusses the idea of 
overlapping consensus wherein varied conceptual modalities, having been formed by 
degrees of fidelity to normative doctrines such as religion or political ideology, achieve a 
sort of public equilibrium. The establishment and maintenance of an overlapping consensus 
is subject to certain conditions. First, the idea is predicated on the notion that members of a 
given national imaginary are granted, as a condition of membership, rights that pertain to 
“equal liberty and conscience.”61 This means that members must have the ability to engage 
in public debate and the power to affect policy and legislation. Second, the forms of debate 
that are encouraged within the public domain are those that are expressly governed by 
reason and appeal to a “political conception of justice.” By this, we can understand Rawls to 
mean that discussions must necessarily focus on worldly concerns related to policy and 
possess a distinctly empirical and rational character. Third, Rawls understands that by virtue 
of a pluralistic body politic, myriad conceptual modalities or “background justifications” 
exist that prompt a member’s adherence to a particular political position. The goal is not to 
completely resolve these differences. Instead, Rawls suggests that rational public debate in a 
direct-access society will allow its members to reach a consensus on issues of policy and 
legislation despite potentially significant variance in the background justifications of those 
members. The reward for success in this enterprise is the establishment of an independent 
political ethic; failure results in controversy and dissent. 
                                                
60 Rawls, "The Idea Of An Overlapping Consensus", p. 1-25  
61 Ibid. 15. 
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 In Rawls’ formulation, the condition of rational public debate requires a secular 
modern democratic state. By categorizing religious authority as a source of background 
justification, it relegates the religious into the realm of private reason. It is perhaps for this 
reason that the idea is so appealing to Taylor and Asad. However, one must inquire as to 
what exactly the process is by which rational public debate actualizes as an independent 
political ethic. Taylor takes up this question by asserting that citizenship ought to be the 
primary principle of identity.  Regarding this, Asad writes, “When Taylor says that the 
modern state has to make citizenship the primary principle of identity, he refers to the way it 
must transcend the different identities built on class, gender, and religion, replacing 
conflicting perspectives by unifying experience. In an important sense, this transcendent 
mediation is secularism.”62 This is not to claim that citizenship is secularism, rather, this 
highlights the idea that citizenship should transcend all other categories, and in so doing, 
allow for the potential of an overlapping consensus. As to the actual mechanics of the 
debate, Taylor believes the outcome to be dependent on a process of persuasion and 
negotiation. However, Asad disagrees on this point, and refutes the utility of this 
categorization as invoked by Rawls and Taylor. At the risk of seeming reductive, one might 
suggest that the formulation of an overlapping consensus introduced by Rawls and 
elaborated by Taylor presents a bottom-up strategy that relies heavily on the direct access 
nature of the modern democratic state. Asad, on the other hand, highlights the factors that 
create a distance between citizens and their elected representatives such to the point where 
the idea of a direct access system becomes highly questionable. The reality of the modern 
democratic state is that political elites and special interest groups hold a monopoly on the 
                                                
62 Asad, Formations of the Secular, Kindle Loc. 115 
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ability to influence public policy.  As Asad writes, “The ordinary citizen does not participate 
in the process of formulating policy options as these elites do—his or her participation in 
periodic elections does not even guarantee that the policies voted for will be adhered to.”63 
Ultimately,  
 
the assumption that liberal democracy ushers in a direct-access society seems to me 
questionable. The forms of mediation characteristic of modern society certainly 
differ from medieval Christian—and Islamic—ones, but this is not a simple matter of 
the absence of ‘religion’ in the public life of the modern nation-state. For even in 
modern secular countries the place of religion varies.64 
 
As a consequence, Asad’s view of overlapping consensus is that it is a project of the 
political elites as a means of mediating violence: “The distinctive feature of modern liberal 
governance, I would submit, is neither compulsion (force) nor negotiation (consent) but the 
statecraft that uses ‘self-discipline’ and ‘participation,’ ‘law,’ and ‘economy’ as elements of 
political strategy.”65 This position has a particular relevance in Japan. As I have mentioned 
previously, the politics of memory is mediated by competing narratives of war and defeat.  
In Post-War Japan, the formulation and implementation of the concepts of “self-discipline 
and participation, law, and economy” have been mediated by these narratives.   
 I submit that the proceedings of the judiciary operate as the forum within which an 
overlapping consensus is represented in a society that is not, as Asad suggests, direct access.  
                                                
63 Ibid loc. 109. 
64 Ibid loc. 124. 
65 Ibid loc. 89. 
  54 
Matters before the judicial system in Japan encounter a system that was fashioned more in 
the likeness of American institutions than they had been during the institutional 
reconfigurations of the Meiji Period.66 Accordingly, I will discuss two significant Japanese 
Supreme Court cases: The Tsu City Groundbreaking Case (1977) and the Ehime Prefecture 
Case (1997). Furthermore, I will examine the controversy surrounding Yasukuni Shrine, a 
prominent Shinto Shrine in Tokyo. The purpose of this exercise is twofold. First, I aim to 
present these considerations (as those in previous chapters) as necessary to the formation of 
an Anthropology of the secular in Japan. Second, through an examination of these items, I 
will argue that, in the case of the secular in Japan, the project of an overlapping consensus 
takes on a unique valence as the result of politics of memory. 
 
The Tsu City Groundbreaking Case 
The 1977 ruling that came to be known as the Tsu City Groundbreaking Ceremony 
Case involved the first Japanese Supreme Court decision regarding the freedom of religion 
as articulated in the 1946 Japanese Constitution.67 In 1965, Tsu City (Mie Prefecture) 
enacted plans for a groundbreaking ceremony for a city gymnasium that involved a Shinto 
ritual known as jichinsai (地鎮祭). A fairly common practice with the construction of new 
buildings, the jichinsai serves the function of pacifying kami (神 Spirits/Gods) of the earth 
and praying for the successful completion and longevity of the construction project. The suit 
was brought by Sekiguchi Seiichi, a city councilor who attended the event against the then 
mayor of Tsu City. Sekiguchi claimed that the city’s sponsorship of the ritual in the form of 
                                                
66 Maxey, The Greatest Problem, p. 97 
67 Herzog, Japan’s Pseudo-Democracy, p. 124-127. 
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the ¥7,663 (¥4000 to Shinto Priests and ¥3663 in offerings) paid by the city violated Article 
89 of the Constitution and should be reimbursed along with ¥50,000 in personal damages as 
the result of having been subjected to a religious rite in a public setting.    
Appearing first in the Tsu District Court, the ruling was that the jichinsai was to be 
considered a “folkway” or custom both in purpose and common usage, thereby not religion 
in relation to Articles 20 and 89.68 This decision was reversed by the Nagoya High Court, 
which concluded that it was impossible to establish whether, and to what degree, the 
jinchinsai might be understood as religious. In To Dream of Dreams: Religious Freedom 
and Constitutional Politics in Postwar Japan, David O’Brien examines the impact of the 
Nagoya High Court Decision in detail.  He writes: 
 
Turning to Tsu city’s argument that it had not violated the Constitution because the 
ceremony was a traditional folkway, the Nagoya High Court advanced a very 
sophisticated analysis of Shinto and the state. First, observed the court, folkways are 
norms or fixed customs passed down over at least three generations. Moreover, 
although they might once have had religious significance, they have over time 
become accepted as secular practices.69 
 
As no clear categorization could be made, the court ruled that the sponsorship of the 
ritual did, indeed, constitute a breach of Articles 20 and 89. However, they refused 
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Sekiguchi’s claim to personal damages.70 The Nagoya High Court statement was intended to 
instruct as much as explain: 
 
Freedom of religion cannot be completely guaranteed without separation of religion 
and the state. Separation of religion and the state is the actual method for realizing 
freedom of religion more concretely, and the principle of the constitutional guarantee 
for freedom of religion. The principle of separation of religion and the state aims at 
being protected against a crisis of destroying the state and of corrupting religion, 
caused by combining the state with religion. If the state combines with a particular 
religion, people believing in other religions would hate, disbelieve, and dislike the 
state. That invites the crisis of destroying the basis for the state. Besides, the state’s 
political and financial support for a particular religion will cause the loss of the 
people’s respect for, and bring about corruption of, that religion.71 
 
The ruling of the Supreme Court in this case remains highly contentious as it set a 
standard by which the absolutist language of Articles 20 and 89 was interpreted as a limited 
separation between religious and public interests out of necessity. According to O’Brien, the 
test for the Tsu City Groundbreaking Ceremony Case was constructed with criterea based on 
the 1971 United States Supreme Court case: Lemon v. Kurtzman.72 This is an important 
dimension to the proceedings. While O’Brien claims that the use of this US Supreme Court 
“purpose and effect” test had to do with the Japanese Supreme Court’s need to lend 
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legitimacy to a precedent case, I suggest that it was also related to a lack of what Maxey 
referred to as the “Grammar of Religion” (and by extension a “grammar of the secular” as I 
argue in Chapter 1).73 This grammar was the bedrock of Japanese judicial and political 
ordering of the religious and the secular. Moreover, while maintaining that the State position 
with regard to religious affairs must be neutral in accordance with Articles 20 and 89, 
Japan’s Supreme Court determined that such neutrality did not necessarily include a 
complete disengagement from religious matters. The court’s decision is expressed as 
follows: 
 
A complete separation of state and religion is near to impossible and would result in 
irrational situations.  The separation, therefore, is of itself within certain limits, and 
depending on the social and cultural conditions of each country, these limits become 
problematic.  Hence, although the principal of separation of state and religion 
demands that the state be neutral in matters of religion, it does not mean that the state 
can have no relations whatever with religion.  Depending on the purpose and effect 
of the action establishing a relation with religion, in case this relation exceeds the 
limits deemed appropriate in light of the above conditions, it must be considered 
unallowable.74 
 
The Tsu City Case was groundbreaking on a number of registers. First, it is 
important to note the phrasing of “limits deemed appropriate” within the court’s summary of 
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the judgment. This is due to the fact that the standard as to what is appropriate vs. what is 
not was established with this case and used as a metric for all subsequent cases in relation to 
the separation of religious and public interest. Additionally, with this decision, the Supreme 
Court set a precedent of not only a test used in related cases over the next twenty years, but 
also a limited separation between the State and religion based on the idea that such a rigid 
separation would be impossible as issues that involve education, welfare, culture, and so 
forth would necessarily encounter border disputes with religion. This limited separation is 
made clear in the following from the second item on the Summary of Judgment: 
 
‘Religious activity’ under Article 20, Paragraph 3 of the Constitution does not mean 
all conduct of the State and its organs that is related to religion, but conduct whose 
purpose has a religious significance and whose effect is to subsidize, promote, or, 
conversely, suppress or interfere with religion.75 
 
O’Brien writes, “In the majority’s view (ten judges to five), the Constitution 
mandated a separation of religion and the state. But the Constitution did not require the kind 
of rigid or complete separation proposed by the Nagoya High Court.”76 The decision by the 
Supreme Court to interpret its position as the arbiter of that which is “Religious activity” and 
that which is not, clearly represents a power dynamic with regard to the relationship between 
religious organizations and the courts that betrays the ostensibly neutral position articulated 
in the decision. It is important here to note that the priests that were tasked with performing 
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the jichinsai were members of the Oichi Shrine, which was a registered religious 
corporation.77 As such, in addition to the ruling having a precarious relationship with the 
language of Articles 20 and 89, it further seems to be in direct violation of the RCA Article 
71 which states that the Religious Corporations Council and the judiciary bodies must “not 
in any form, undertake mediation concerning or interfere in religious matters, such as faith, 
discipline, and customs, etc., of the religious organization”.78 The arbitration of the religious 
content of the jichinsai as performed by a religious organization (Oichi Shrine) as well as 
the payment that they received for serviced rendered, violates these standards. 
Returning to the politics of memory and the idea of overlapping consensus, there are 
several factors beyond its status and longevity as precedent that make this case vital to the 
construction of an anthropology of secularism in Japan. First, it is important to note that 
Sekiguchi, in addition to being a member of the city council, was also a survivor of the war 
(having been born in 1915), and a member of the Communist Party of Japan that opposed 
attempts by the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) to augment official support for war 
memorials.79 Sekiguchi’s claim was less to do with a sense of moral outrage, and more the 
manifestation of political principle that was mediated by a clash between the narratives of 
the Communist Party and that of the Liberal Democratic Party. In “Shifting Paradigms if 
Religion and State” (1999), John Nelson notes the relationship between the LDP and ultra-
nationalist right wing groups, whose rhetoric supports efforts to honor war dead and revise a 
“defeatist” narrative regarding the war.  
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Second, it is important to note the language of the statement issued by the Nagoya 
High Court in consideration of memory. The statement makes authoritative claims as to the 
necessity of the complete separation between religion and the state. This is specifically 
evident in the final sentence that states: “Besides, the state’s political and financial support 
for a particular religion will cause the loss of the people’s respect for, and bring about 
corruption of, that religion.” This is a clear reference to the prior relationship between 
religion and the state in the form of State Shinto. As much as the statement by the Nagoya 
High Court was an appeal towards future processes, it was also a warning to avoid the 
repetition of the past. This statement is highly influenced by the memory of war and the 
relationship between Shinto and the state.  
Third, it is important to note that the discrepancy between the interpretation of 
Articles 20 and 89 rendered by the Nagoya High Court and the Supreme Court. This speaks 
to the absence of an overlapping consensus regarding the legal classification of Shinto. As 
mentioned previously, the precedent set by the Tsu City Groundbreaking Case remained 
intact for the next 20 years until the Ehime Prefecture Case. 
 
The Ehime Prefecture Case 
In 1981, Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo requested that prefectures purchase ritual materials 
(tamagushi) through Yasukuni and/or any of the network of local “Nation Protecting” 
(Gokoku) shrines for use in Shinto ceremonies honoring the war dead.80 Yasukuni Shrine in 
Tokyo is perhaps the most contested site concerning the constitutionality of State interaction 
with religious organizations in modern Japanese history. While Yasukuni’s involvement 
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raises the profile of the case, and adds a complex social dimension to the process of 
deliberation, it is a topic that I will return to in much greater depth in the following section. 
While concluding twenty years later, the Supreme Court decision in the Ehime Prefecture 
Case (1997) stands in stark contrast to the precedent established in the Tsu City 
Groundbreaking Case. Further, it represents the first Supreme Court decision in the fifty 
years since the promulgation of the Japanese Constitution wherein the court ruled that a 
violation of the separation between religion and the state had occurred. To date, it is one of 
only two cases wherein such a judgment has been rendered.81   
 In response to the request from Yasukuni Shrine, the Ehime Prefectural government 
allotted ¥160,000 in public funds for the donations required to receive the ritual materials 
between 1981 and 1986. This was in direct disregard for a directive issued in 1982 by the 
Ministry of Home Affairs that urged the prefectures against continuing to donate to 
Yasukuni Shrine, as there was a potential violation of Articles 20 and 89.82 In 1986, the 
Chief Priest of the Senneji Buddhist Temple, Anzai Kenji, and 24 residents of Ehime 
Prefecture filed suit with the Matsuyama District Court on the grounds that governor 
Shiraishi Haruki and six other officials had violated Articles 20 and 89 through the 
donations on behalf of the prefecture to the Gokoku and Yasukuni Shrines. Shiraishi 
maintained that the purpose of the donations was purely a matter of social etiquette and that 
the amount of the donations was within the “limits deemed appropriate” as set forth in the 
Tsu City Groundbreaking Ceremony Case. Moreover, Shiraishi claimed that the donations 
were meant to honor the war dead, and as such had no specific religious content. Despite 
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Shiraishi’s objections, the Matsuyama District court found that Shiraishi was in violation of 
Article 20 and that the donations represented “a special bond” between the prefectural 
government and the shrines in question.83 As such, the District Judge ordered Shiraishi to 
repay the total amount of the donations from the five-year period. Shiraishi appealed the 
decision with the Takamatsu High Court. 
In May of 1992, the Takamatsu High Court overturned the decision of the 
Matsuyama District Court. Judge Kazuo Takagi ruled in the spirit of Shiraishi’s original 
objections that the donations were meant to honor the war dead. The donations were offered 
in such small denominations over a five-year period that the amount could not be considered 
as financial support for the shrines in question. However, as Peter Herzog points out in his 
book, Japan’s Pseudo Democracy, “Donations to Shinto shrines do not cease to be 
contributions to religious organizations because they are meant to honor the war dead and 
the quantitative plus or minus does not change their character.”84 
Ten years after the filing of the original suit, the Supreme Court announced that it 
would hear arguments in the Ehime Prefecture Case. In April of 1997, the Supreme Court 
reversed the decision of the Takamatsu High Court and in favor of the original decision 
rendered by the Matsuyama District Court. Again, while the Supreme Court in this case 
ruled that a violation of Article twenty had occurred, the legal test employed in this case was 
the same as had been used in the Tsu City Groundbreaking Ceremony Case (outlined in the 
previous section) nearly two decades prior. Hence it is important to note, that from the 
position of the judiciary, the metric by which the courts determine if a breach of Articles 20 
                                                
83 O’Brien, To Dream of Dreams, p. 122 
84 Herzog, Japan’s Pseudo Democracy, p. 118 
  63 
and 89 had occurred had not changed in twenty years. That said, the Supreme Court 
augmented the test and rendered a decision that set a new legal precedent. Through this shift 
in the legal test used by the court, the “limited separation” between religious organizations 
and the State articulated in the Tsu Case was renegotiated. The court established this new 
precedent in a number of ways. First, they argued that Yasukuni Shrine is a religious 
organization as a matter of public knowledge and that the ritual items in question were 
related to deeply religious ceremonies; this, unlike jichinsai, which has an arguably less 
religious purpose, constitutes a clear religious intent. Second, the Court noted that Ehime 
Prefecture had not donated funds to any other religious organizations with whom similar 
rituals for honoring the war dead exist.  Third, the Court acknowledged the “various harmful 
effects” could be possible in an entanglement between the State and religious organizations 
as evinced in the prewar period.  The Court’s position is expressed in the following 
statement: 
 
Considering the above circumstances in totality, it must be recognized that the 
prefecture's giving of the donations for tamagushi cannot escape having as a purpose 
some religious meaning and the effect of assisting, promoting, and advancing a 
particular religion. For this reason, the connection between the prefecture and 
Yasukuni Shrine exceeds the appropriate limit as illuminated by our country's social 
and cultural conditions. 
It is appropriate to understand the donations as religious activities prohibited 
by Article 20(3) of the Constitution. Thus understanding the expenditures as 
religious activities prohibited by section 3, they are illegal. Also, considering the 
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above analysis, the donations are public expenditures prohibited by Article 89 of the 
Constitution and are illegal.85 
 
The Ehime Prefecture Case is also of significant import to the project of an 
anthropology of secularism in Japan. The Tsu City Groundbreaking Ceremony Case 
represents a period wherein the “rules that governed not only the practice of religion, but its 
discursive boundaries as well,” as Maxey writes with regards to the project of the Meiji 
government, were still being negotiated. The precedent set by the Tsu Case called for a 
limited separation between religion and the state in Japan, and endured for twenty years.  
The Ehime Prefecture Case overturned this idea and moved towards a strict application of 
Articles 20 and 89, and as a consequence a rigid separation between religion and the state.  
In addition to these changes, there are aspects of this case that are mediated by memory. It 
should be noted that the defendant in the Ehime Prefecture Case, Shiraishi Haruki, was a 
member of the of the Japan Association of War Bereaved Families (JAWBF).86 This right-
wing organization has been the leading force in the funding, maintenance, defense, and 
promotion of Yasukuni Shrine and its network of related gokoku shrines. Furthermore, the 
dispute that was the foundation for the case was the offering of financial support to shrines 
whose primary purpose was the enshrinement of war dead. These factors and those 
associated with the Tsu Case present an alternate interpretation of these cases wherein the 
contests in only involved with questions of religiosity on the surface. Below the surface, the 
courts became forums wherein competing historical narratives vied to assert themselves as 
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an overlapping consensus.  In these cases specifically, the polemic and pervasive natures of 
these narratives are being implicitly negotiated through the explicit negotiation of disputes 
regarding religious freedom.  In this way, the project of secularism in Japan operates overtly 
on the positioning of public and private reason as well as operating subtly on the validation 
of competing modes of memory.  
 
Yasukuni Shrine 
In an idyllic setting amidst hundreds of cherry blossom trees that seem to repel the urban 
clamour from the surrounding city of Tokyo, stands Yasukuni Shrine. Contructed between 
1869 and 1871, Yasukuni Shrine is a short distance from the Imperial Palace and its grounds 
are home to the Yūshūkan War Museum, which it manages and operates. In an introduction 
to an article entitled “The Dead and The Living in the Land of Peace,” John Breen writes: 
“Of all the sites dedicated to the war dead in the democratic nations, none has courted such 
controversy as Japan’s Yasukuni Shrine.”87 This controversy derives from the fact that 
Yasukuni Shrine exists as the primary site for the enshrinement of the souls of those killed 
in the military service of Japan from 1868 onward. These conflicts include all military 
activities involving Japan from the Boshin War to the present day. While those enshrined are 
mainly Japanese, they also include a number of Korean, Chinese, and other foreign civilian 
workers and conscripts who are considered to have died in the service of the Japanese 
Empire. Additionally, among the roughly 2.5 million souls of wartime dead enshrined at 
Yasukuni are included 14 Class A war criminals that include Tōjō Hideki, the Japanese 
Prime Minister during much of the Asia-Pacific War. More than any other site in Japan, 
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Yasukuni is a nexus for competing nationalistic ideologies, frameworks for “public” and 
“private,” and historical narratives involving Japan’s Imperial past. 
The complicated history of Yasukuni Shrine involves a struggle for religious and 
political identity, as well as instability of mutual mediation between them. Breen writes, 
“Yasukuni was the creation of the modern state, the shrine and its priests were funded by the 
state, and its rituals for the dead were designed to meet the modern state’s political needs:  to 
cultivate patriotism through the apotheosis for self-sacrifice.”88 Like the discussion of the 
court cases in the last section, the controversies surrounding Yasukuni Shrine stem from the 
duality of its identity. While there are certainly religious elements, Yasukuni has always 
been an instrument of the State and a tangible mechanism by which the government 
mediated the memory of violence. In addition to the enshrinement of military war-dead at 
Yasukuni, the shrine became the leading institution associated with State Shinto and the 
worship of the Imperial Line in the years leading up to the end of the Asia Pacific War. At 
this time, it was the policy of the Japanese government that State Shinto not be considered as 
a religion, but rather a system of ritual directed towards the Emperor whose obligations were 
civic in nature. The primary focus of State Shinto consisted of rituals intended to elevate and 
inspire loyalty to the Emperor. With Yasukuni as its center, many of the important ritual 
functions involving the worship of the emperor took place at Yasukuni during this time.  
Regarding the present connection between Yasukuni and the Imperial Line, Breen writes, 
“The imperial connection is very much alive in Yasukuni, and it is this which ensures the 
sense of continuity with the past.  Indeed, Yasukuni rites today perform substantially the 
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same ideological function as they did prior to 1945.”89 During wartime, death in the service 
to the empire and consequent enshrinement at Yasukuni Shrine was propagated as among 
the highest honors that one might achieve. This epistemic shift occurred not only within 
those serving in the military, but was part of a process of what David C. Earhart has called 
“kamekazification” that mediated the growth of nationalistic fervor that galvanized Japan’s 
wartime ambitions.90 Presently, while not a member of the Association of Shinto Shrines 
(Jinja Honchō 神社本庁), Yasukuni Shrine is registered as a religious organization under the 
Religious Corporations Act. Hence, from the legal perspective, Yasukuni Shrine is a 
religious entity. The Shrine staff is very forthcoming regarding its adherence to Shinto 
principals and observances. According to the Yasukuni website, rituals are performed daily 
in addition to a long list of annual festivals and observances.91 Yasukuni Shrine embodies a 
complicated history of identity and memory that frames the set of recent controversies 
beginning in 1975. 
In 1983, Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro formed an advisory committee to 
consider the legal ramifications of an official visit to Yasukuni Shrine that Nakasone had 
planned for August 1985. This date was significant as it marked the fortieth anniversary of 
the end of the Asia Pacific War.92 This precaution on the part of the Prime Minister was in 
anticipation of the public backlash that such a visit would receive. Being that Yasukuni 
Shrine is registered as a religious corporation and is broadly recognized in a variety of forms 
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as a religious center, an official visit and/or the purchase of ritual offerings by any member 
of the government could be unconstitutional under Articles 20 and 89. Visits to Yasukuni by 
Prime Ministers in particular have involved a heightened domestic and international 
scrutiny. Former Prime Minister Koizumi Jun’ichirō visited Yasukuni annually during his 
time in office between 2001 and 2006. Like many other Japanese government officials, 
Koizumi visited Yasukuni as a private citizen; in this way, he was able to avoid a direct 
violation of constitutional law. This, however, did not prevent a very public response to his 
visits. This response is emblematic of the polarized public opinion regarding the “Yasukuni 
Problem” (Yasukuni mondaī 靖国問題). 
The contours of the polemic discourse surrounding Yasukuni Shrine (commonly 
known as the “Yasukuni Problem”) are fairly involved. In “The Yasukuni Controversy” 
(2007), author Ryu Yongwook discusses the problem at some length. First and foremost, 
Yasukuni is a site wherein those who died in service to Japan are enshrined, and according 
to Ryu, “this is how most Japanese regard Yasukuni Shrine; it is a place for commemorating 
those who have fallen in service to the country.”93 Nationalist groups such as the Japan War 
Bereaved Families Association (Nippon izokukai日本遺族会) support official visits by 
government officials to Yasukuni because they consider it an obligatory duty to honor those 
who have died in the country’s service. The JWBFA maintains strong ties both with 
Yasukuni Shrine and with Japan’s majority Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). This adds an 
increased pressure for official visits to Yasukuni. The rhetoric behind this position focuses 
on expunging what they understand as defeatist logic from public discourse. Nationalist 
groups in Japan fall to the right on the political spectrum and advocate change in the form of 
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re-militarization and historical revisionism in the service of bolstering the waning sense of 
patriotism among the youth.94 
Every year on the anniversary of the end of the Asia Pacific War, right wing 
nationalist groups flock to Yasukuni to take part in paramilitary demonstrations around the 
shrine grounds. These demonstrations often clash with anti-war and anti-imperialist left-
wing activists who also demonstrate during this time. The left-wing position often mirrors 
that of international concerns in wanting Japan to accept the weight of its accountability to 
its militaristic and colonial past. As mentioned previously, Yasukuni stands as a monument 
to Japan’s imperial past and a direct embodiment of State Shinto and Japan’s wartime 
ideology. Hence, official visits to Yasukuni are seen as glorifying Japan’s violent history 
and valorizing the war criminals responsible. In addition to leftist groups such as the Anti-
Emperor Activities Network maintaining this position domestically, Japan’s relationship 
with its neighbors (particularly China and Korea) is heavily influenced by the Japanese 
government position with regard to Yasukuni. As Ryu writes, “The Yasukuni issue is a 
window through which foreign countries, especially Korea and China, view Japan’s self-
understanding of its history of aggression. Thus, Yasukuni has become a political barometer 
by which to judge Japan’s ‘moral behavior’.”95 
While this is a broad overview of the ideological dimensions of the Yasukuni 
problem, it is sufficient to highlight the politics of memory involved in the controversy.  
This politics of memory, active in many of the disputes involving the constitutionality of the 
actions of the State with regard to religion maintains religion as a constituative element, but 
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by no means makes religious concerns prime among them. The controversy surrounding 
Yasukuni Shrine mobilizes the constitutional articles related to the freedom of religion as 
their front lines, however, religion plays a much smaller role in the actual ideological 
conflict that the Yasukuni Problem represents. Rather, contested historical memory, national 
identity, and political ideology are at the core of the issue. Hence, what is ostensibly a 
dispute involving religion, actually has a much broader context. In a discussion of the 
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IV.  TOWARDS AN ANTHROPOLOGY OF SECULARISM 
 In service to the goal of establishing a set of tools and considerations as well as the 
preliminary gestures towards defining a conceptual framework from which an anthropology 
of secularism might take shape in the context of Japan, I will conclude by means of 
addressing the organization of this thesis. The first chapter introduced the framework for an 
anthropology of secularism as articulated by Talal Asad with considerable reference to the 
writings of Charles Taylor. Additionally, this chapter offered an exploration of some of the 
essential developments and figures from the Late Tokugawa period and through the Meiji 
period that substantially influenced the development of the project of secularism in Japan 
prior to the Asia Pacific War. This is of particular relevance to an anthropology of 
secularism as it highlights the reality that the project of secularism in Japan did not simply 
emerge with Japan’s surrender in 1945. Rather, secularism has been a dominant feature in 
Japanese social and political discourse prior to its reconfiguration in the 1946 Constitution 
of Japan. As such an anthropology of secularism in Japan would necessarily need to account 
for the developments in the project of secularism for the entirety of its trajectory. The 
historical exposition offered here is by no means intended as definitive. Rather, it is intended 
as a starting point from which a much more rigorous historical analysis might proceed. 
 In the second chapter, the discussion centered around the concept of an “independent 
political ethic” and articulating the level of complexity involved in identifying the issues that 
are particular to Japan and intertwine the project of secularism with competing narratives of 
memory.  As the result of my reading of Asad, Taylor, and Ralws, I have proposed that an 
independent political ethic is never a complete process or a final goal where one might 
arrive and declare finality.  Rather it is process that is best exemplified in the laws and 
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guidelines to which a body politic by virtue of their citizenship, is obligated to abide.  As 
such, in the case of the project of secularism, the laws that govern the distinctions between 
public and private, religious and non-religious, and sacred and profane are perhaps the best 
place to begin an examination of the status of the process of an independent political ethic.  
Asad and Taylor maintain that a project of secularism becomes truly actualized with the 
ongoing establishment of an independent political ethic.  This establishment is made 
possible through the process of negotiating an overlapping consensus and is the topic of the 
third chapter. 
 The mobilization of the Tsu City Groundbreaking Case, the Ehime Prefecture Case, 
and an exploration of the controversy around Yasukuni Shrine was enacted for a number of 
reasons.  First, with regard to the two court cases, despite having a similar dispute, they were 
selected as they represented two very different outcomes.  Accordingly, they represent 
opposite ends of the judicial spectrum within which an anthropology of secularism would 
need to account for a number of similar court cases.  Second, if the status of an independent 
political ethic is to be found in the laws and guidelines of a nation, the forum by which the 
independent political ethic is mediated is to be found in the courts.   Finally, with these cases 
and the controversy surrounding Yasukuni Shrine,  the motivation for formalizing the 
dispute could be argued as also having a connection to competing narratives of memory as 
much as conflict over the religious content of public affairs.  This was in service to 
highlighting the relationship between the project of secularism and memory in Japan that 
would need to be an area of exploration in the event of a formal anthropological 
investigation.    
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 In summary, the foregoing has not been an endeavor that is intended as a definitive 
guide to myriad areas of knowledge and experience required to construct an anthropology of 
secularism in Japan. Rather, the intent is more of an invitation so that we might begin to 
think about the potential for the mobilization of existing frameworks regarding secularism 
and the areas within Japanese history and society where we might begin to apply them.  The 
project of secularism in Japan is a vibrant and dynamic feature of social life in Japan and a 
nexus of political and historical contingencies. As I hope this thesis has shown, to address 
the topic from an anthropological perspective with anything less than a rigorous examination 
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